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INTRODUCTION
If people were not involved with autonomous vehicles,
privacy would not be an issue. Because people will be
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appreciated research assistance was provided by Nicole Hess.
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intended users and purchasers of autonomous vehicles,
understanding where and how privacy and autonomous
vehicles will interact is important to the success of these new
modes of personal mobility. Whenever a person is linked with
an autonomous vehicle, privacy interests become important.
Among the social and cultural issues that may be “the most
slippery territory for autonomous vehicles,”1 the most
challenging are privacy interests.
Privacy norms center on the unique dignity of each
individual human person. They are expressed in several
types of privacy interests that will affect, and be affected by,
autonomous vehicles. For example, autonomous vehicles will
affect individual autonomy by taking control over an
important aspect of people’s lives—the way in which they
move from place to place. Autonomous vehicles are also likely
to raise concerns about personal information privacy when
autonomous vehicles generate personal information about the
people who use them. Potential use of autonomous vehicles
as tools for comprehensively tracking people’s travels affects
privacy interests associated with concerns about surveillance.
In the future, autonomous vehicles will need to accommodate
such privacy interests, just as privacy interests are likely to
adapt to autonomous vehicles. This Article explores these
synergies.
Two factors complicate thinking about interactions
between autonomous vehicles and privacy. First, interactions
between autonomous vehicles and privacy are not now a
presently observable phenomenon. Not yet marketed as
consumer products, autonomous vehicles exist at present only
in a variety of prototypes and experimental models.
Therefore, it is necessary to project privacy issues onto a
future world in which autonomous vehicles without active
drivers move people and goods across roads and highways.
Second, interactions between privacy and autonomous
vehicles involve relationships between two flexible concepts
that can be difficult to pin down. Precise details of what
consumer versions of autonomous vehicles will be like are not

1. Tom Vanderbilt, Let the Robot Drive: The Autonomous Car of the Future
MAGAZINE,
Feb.
23,
2012,
available
at
Is
Here,
WIRED
http://www.wired.com/magazine/2012/01/ff_autonomouscars.
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now known.2 Experimental versions discussed in this Article
suggest a broad range of possible configurations. Just about
the only characteristic that all autonomous vehicles appear to
share is the dispensability of an active human driver.
Moreover, privacy is a notoriously contentious concept with a
number of different and evolving meanings. As a result,
exploring potential interactions between privacy and selfdriving vehicles (neither of which has a fixed meaning) is
intellectually challenging.
This exploration of privacy in autonomous vehicles
begins by contrasting two potential types of autonomous
vehicles that, if developed into consumer products, would
interact with privacy in different ways. It will then look at
some of the different types of potential autonomous vehicle
users. Next, the Article examines three types of privacy
interests likely to be affected by autonomous vehicles:
autonomy privacy interests, personal information privacy
interests, and surveillance privacy interests.
After
considering the reasonableness of expectations of privacy in
the context of autonomous vehicles, this discussion will turn
to some suggested strategies for optimizing potential
synergies between privacy and autonomous vehicles.
I.

TYPES OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES

Interactions between privacy and autonomous vehicles
will depend on the design and operation of autonomous
vehicles. A wide range of possible types of autonomous
vehicles will apply different technologies to operate motor
vehicles in different ways.3 All of them replace human
drivers with artificial intelligence, but do so in different ways.
Because privacy is concerned with individual people, this
discussion focuses on personal vehicles that, if not
autonomous, would require human drivers to make personal

2. Autonomous vehicles are more than just self-moving, or self-propelled,
vehicles. Self-propelled movement is what the word “automobile” connotes.
Rather, an autonomous vehicle is operated and controlled by systems of
artificial intelligence either inside or outside the vehicle or a combination of
internal and external control. Autonomous vehicles, which may also be called
“driverless” or “self-driving” vehicles, can take many physical forms and may be
powered by any type of engine—electric, internal combustion, hydrogen, etc.
3. See Sven A. Beiker, Legal Aspects of Autonomous Driving, 52 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1145, 1146–49 (2012).
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The potential universe of
journeys on public roads.4
autonomous vehicles would include trucks, buses, taxis,
However, personal
emergency vehicles, and the like.5
autonomous vehicles used by people who have privacy
interests are the most interesting in considering privacy
issues.
From a privacy perspective, it can matter a great deal
how a vehicle’s artificial intelligence interacts with the
vehicle user and the roadway environment, as well as what
data the vehicle sends or receives.
When artificial
intelligence replaces the driver in a driverless car, the
vehicle’s autonomous systems will rely on a number of data
sources to assess the driving environment and to control the
operation of the vehicle. In thinking about privacy, there are
considerable differences between two general types of
autonomous vehicles. This discussion refers to them as, on
the one hand, selfcontained autonomous vehicles and, on the
other hand, interdependent autonomous vehicles. These are
simply models of groups of characteristics that future
autonomous vehicles may have. They are not technical
categories, but rather theoretical examples that help in
thinking about the interactions between privacy and
autonomous vehicles. It is likely that future autonomous
vehicles will combine features of both of these models.
Three technological factors distinguish between these two
versions of autonomous vehicles and shape the interactions
between autonomous vehicles and privacy: (1) where the
controlling artificial intelligence is located, (2) how external
data, such as information about the roadway around the
vehicle, is collected and transmitted to the vehicle and (3)
whether internal vehicle data is transmitted beyond the
vehicle. As will be explained more fully below, selfcontained
autonomous vehicles deal with these factors differently

4. Personal vehicles are typically privately-owned or leased passenger cars,
fleet-owned passenger vehicles, or certain types of individually operated
commercial vehicles that are ordinarily operated by human drivers on public
roadways.
5. Autonomous mass transit vehicles such as public trolleys, light rail, or
heavy rail streetcars already exist and pose separate privacy and security
challenges for their users. Also not within the ambit of this discussion are
vehicles that do not regularly operate on public roadways; such as military
transports, mining vehicles, off-road vehicles, or farm tractors.
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from interdependent autonomous vehicles.
All types of autonomous vehicles apply artificial
intelligence to integrate both internal data from within the
vehicle and external data about the environment outside the
vehicle. Then the vehicle’s analytic processes determine how
the vehicle behaves (speed, direction, braking, etc.). Most
experimental autonomous vehicles locate most of that
artificial intelligence within the vehicle itself. That is why
autonomous personal vehicles are sometimes referred to as
“self-driving cars.” But it is also possible for all or part of the
intelligence controlling an interconnected autonomous vehicle
to be located outside the vehicle and communicated to the
interconnected vehicle over a wireless vehicular network.
The selfcontained autonomous vehicle does not connect to
such a network and therefore is not subject to external
control.
Both the selfcontained and the interdependent
autonomous vehicles will rely on internally facing sensors
that collect and feed data about how a vehicle and its various
parts are operating to a central sensing and diagnostic
component that analyzes vehicle data from various parts of
the vehicle. Most non-autonomous modern vehicles already
contain such sensors. According to a writer in the IEEE
Spectrum, even in 2009 it took “dozens of microprocessors
running 100 million lines of code to get a premium car out of
the driveway.” 6 Consumers may be aware of these sensors
because some of them provide information to an Event Data
Recorder associated with air bag systems in most vehicles.
Internal sensors can also collect continuous data about
vehicle status that is potentially useful to vehicle
manufacturers, traffic engineers, insurance companies, and
the like. When this vehicle status and operation information
is associated with an identifiable individual, the data
becomes personal information that is important for privacy
purposes. When a vehicle records such internal sensor data,
for example through data logging, it is recording personal
information about an identifiable vehicle user’s location and

6. R. N. Charette, This Car Runs on Code, IEEE SPECTRUM (Feb. 2009),
available at http://spectrum.ieee.org/green-tech/advanced-cars/this-car-runs-oncode/0. By comparison, it takes 6.5 million lines of software code to operate the
avionics and onboard support systems of a Boeing 787 Dreamliner. Id.
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behavior. Some vehicle data may be anonymous. However,
absent privacy precautions, much of a vehicle’s internal
sensor data is potentially linkable to the vehicle user and is
therefore personal information that raises privacy issues.
External situational information about what is going on
around the vehicle, such as what else is on, or potentially on,
the roadway is also necessary for autonomous vehicles to
operate. The selfcontained model of autonomous vehicles
exclusively uses onboard outward-facing sensors (such as
cameras, radar, thermal imaging devices, and LIDAR (light
detection and ranging) to collect data about the roadway
environment outside the vehicle. Typically, it matches this
external information to digital maps within the vehicle. In
contrast, the interconnected model of autonomous vehicles is
characterized by receiving external roadway situational
information through wireless communications networks. The
connected vehicle systems currently under development are
designed to transmit data about the sending vehicle’s internal
status (exact location, speed, heading, and the like) as well as
about general roadway, traffic, and weather conditions in the
vicinity to other nearby autonomous vehicles. Navigational
guidance and travel information may also be carried over
vehicular networks.
Interconnected autonomous vehicles are characterized by
participating in such a vehicular network over which they
both send and receive data.
Selfcontained autonomous
vehicles do not participate in the network at all and therefore
retain within the vehicle all of its internal and external data,
as well as full control over the operation of the vehicle.
Although separated for the purpose of this discussion into two
distinct autonomous vehicle models, future autonomous
vehicles may well combine features of both models.
A. Selfcontained Autonomous Vehicles Contrasted with
Interconnected Autonomous Vehicles
Selfcontained autonomous vehicles are defined by their
reliance solely on information generated from onboard the
vehicle, which provides data regarding both internal vehicle
operations and the external environment. These vehicles
typically also have internal maps of the roadways to be
traversed. A selfcontained autonomous vehicle will generate,
collect, and retain a great deal of information about the
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vehicle, its operation, and the status of its user. That
information remains entirely inside the selfcontained vehicle
unless or until the information is removed. The selfcontained
autonomous vehicle is not connected to any vehicular
network, is not subject to external control, does not rely on
off-board sources of information, and does not communicate
vehicle-related data beyond the vehicle itself. This is the
general configuration of the experimental Google car.7
In contrast, interconnected autonomous vehicles are
wirelessly connected to a communications network, or
possibly multiple communications networks. Such a vehicle
could potentially be controlled through the network, either
directly through operational commands sent to the vehicle or
indirectly through selective communication of information
known to cause the vehicle to behave in a particular way. For
interconnected vehicles, the network provides situational
information communicated by external sources of information
about the immediate roadway environment through which
the vehicle is passing.
Information transmitted to an
interconnected autonomous vehicle may include status
messages from other vehicles or persons that share the
network, as well as GPS location data, traffic, and weather
reports.
The interconnected autonomous vehicle also
automatically transmits its own internal vehicle status data
through the network to nearby vehicles or to other network
users.
The United States Department of Transportation
(USDOT) is developing this type of vehicular network in its
Connected Vehicle Program.8 Connected vehicles receive over
a wireless channel information about the roadway
7. Erico Guizzo, How Google’s Self-Driving Car Works, IEEE SPECTRUM,
http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/artificial-intelligence/how-googleself-driving-car-works (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). The Google Car apparently
uses GPS for basic location data, but does not entirely rely on GPS in
determining vehicle location.
8. The Interconnected version of autonomous vehicles would use
technologies under development in the Connected Vehicle research program.
Connected Vehicle Research, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.: RESEARCH & INNOVATIVE
TECH. ADMIN., http://www.its.dot.gov/connected_vehicle/connected_vehicle.htm
(last visited Apr. 22, 2012).
The National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration is currently studying the application of this Connected Vehicle
type of autonomous vehicle. Stephen P. Wood et. al., The Potential Regulatory
Challenges of Increasingly Autonomous Motor Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
1423, 1426–27, 1429, 1431–34 (2012).
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environment, including the presence and behavior of other
road users. In the Connected Vehicle Program, this network
is cooperative in that a vehicle both receives and shares
internal vehicle sensor information (speed, velocity, heading,
etc.) with other similarly connected, data-sharing vehicles
through
what
are
called
vehicle-to-vehicle
(V2V)
communications.9 Assuming that it uses the Connected
Vehicle systems currently under development, an
interconnected autonomous vehicle could also communicate
vehicle status data in real time to roadside infrastructure for
use by traffic management centers, toll collection agencies, or
law enforcement through vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I)
communications or to mobile devices (V2D). Sometimes the
array of potential recipients of vehicle data is simply
described as vehicle to “whatever” (V2X).
For some
communications, such as real-time communications with
other nearby vehicles, the speed and low latency provided by
a technology known as dedicated short-range communications
(DSRC) is likely to be essential.
For other types of
communications, interconnected autonomous vehicles can use
various forms of wireless communications, for example,
telematics systems such as that used in General Motors’
OnStar. If it follows the parameters of the Connected Vehicle
Program, an interconnected autonomous vehicle might well
use a mix of information and guidance provided to the vehicle
over multiple wireless networks.
B. Privacy Comparison
These two contrasting models of autonomous vehicles
have very different privacy implications. On the one hand,
the selfcontained autonomous vehicle will generate, analyze,
and maintain information, including personal information,
solely within the vehicle itself. On the other hand, the
interconnected autonomous vehicle is designed to interact
continuously with an external network. This network either

9. In the USDOT “Connected Vehicle Program,” the Core (or Core System),
is such an enterprise network for communications among vehicles and between
vehicles and other elements participating in the Core, such as traffic
management, navigation applications and many other potential users.
Connected Vehicle Core System Baseline Documentation, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.:
RESEARCH & INNOVATIVE TECH. ADMIN., http://www.its.dot.gov/press/2011/
connected_vehicle_coresystem_docs.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2012).
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may simply provide necessary information about the external
situation for the autonomous vehicle to determine how to
operate or may directly control the interconnected vehicle’s
operation.
Overall, selfcontained autonomous vehicles may seem
more private than interconnected autonomous vehicles. That
is both because selfcontained vehicle guidance does not
receive information or control messages from external
sources, and because the selfcontained model does not send
internal vehicle status information to or through an external
network. The fact that information and control remain inside
the selfcontained vehicle also makes this model seem more
secure.
Interconnected autonomous vehicles appear more privacy
risky because they depend upon vehicular networks that are
external to the vehicles. The personal autonomy of users
would be affected by an interconnected autonomous vehicle’s
susceptibility to external control. In fact, an interconnected
vehicle could be externally controlled in two ways. First,
indirect control could be exerted by manipulating information
transmitted to an autonomous vehicle programmed to behave
in a predictable way upon receiving such information. For
example, the vehicle could be caused to change route by
sending it data indicating that the road ahead is blocked.
Second, the network could communicate direct operational
commands. For example, a network command could stop a
vehicle or cause the vehicle to go to destinations not chosen
by its user. Were all of the operations of an interconnected
vehicle’s movements directly controlled by external decision
makers, the autonomous vehicle itself would appear to be no
longer autonomous. Rather it would be under remote control.
Such an externally controlled vehicle would not be driving
itself. Instead, it would be driven by a decisionmaker other
than the vehicle or its user. It might be called a “puppet
vehicle,” because the external decisionmaker would control
the vehicle as if a puppeteer were pulling the strings of a
marionette. In this situation, all personal autonomy of the
user would be eliminated.
With regard to personal information privacy, both types
of autonomous vehicles are likely to have highly detailed
continuous data regarding vehicle location, as well as
information about where the user wanted to go, did go, and
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what the user could have seen along the way.
In
selfcontained autonomous vehicles, personal information
would be concentrated on-board the vehicle. As a result, the
vehicle itself would be a repository of personal information
about everywhere its user had traveled, how the vehicle had
traveled, and everything encountered along the way. This
personal information contained within the vehicle would be
vulnerable to hacking, burglary, and potential access by
investigators, both private and governmental. Enhanced
physical and data security would be essential to protect the
privacy of personal information in the selfcontained
autonomous vehicle. Moreover, measures such as encryption,
personal data minimization, and frequent data destruction
would be crucial to protect personal information in
selfcontained autonomous vehicles. Real-time surveillance of
selfcontained autonomous vehicles would be possible through
outside tracking, but not from within the vehicle itself.
An interconnected autonomous vehicle presents more
risks to personal information because interconnected vehicles
are designed to be engaged in constant network
communication of such personal information as the user’s
real-time location. The vehicular communications network,
on which the interconnected autonomous vehicle relies, would
have many more potential data breach points at which
personal information could be extracted, hacked or might leak
out. Any such network would have to provide robust personal
information protection and network security measures,
including encryption and anonymization, to guard against
privacy risks. Indeed, legislation or regulation may require
strong network privacy protections for interconnected
autonomous vehicle communications networks. The network
on which interconnected autonomous vehicles would rely
could also be used for surveillance of every interconnected
vehicle. That is why privacy protections and strict controls
over access to the network will be essential to protect the
privacy of interconnected autonomous vehicle users.
Although potential impacts on privacy may seem greater
in the context of an interconnected autonomous vehicle, those
potential privacy impacts do not mean that one type of
autonomous vehicle is necessarily better than another. It
simply means that different types and degrees of privacy
protection will be needed depending on the types of
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technologies represented by the two models of autonomous
vehicles discussed here, or whatever combination of
technologies is eventually built into future autonomous
vehicles.
C. Outliers
One type of autonomous vehicle that has been the object
of considerable speculation is not yet available even in
prototype. That is an autonomous vehicle with its own
imagination, emotions, and capacity for independent
judgment. A vehicle with the ability to make spontaneous
choices regarding why to travel, when and where to go, and
how to get there, completely independently of human
initiation or intervention, exists at present only in fiction. If
such a vehicle were developed in the future, it might threaten
not only the privacy interests discussed here, but also other
human values.10
Fictional examples of autonomous vehicles with
imaginations and emotions, as well as capacities for
independent
judgment,
are
usually
highly
anthropomorphized, with out-sized personalities and uncanny
abilities to communicate in human languages or even in
Morse code.11 These fictional autonomous vehicles can be
seen in animated films (Cars12) or romantic fantasies (Chitty
Chitty Bang Bang13 and The Love Bug14) or appear as
sidekicks in science-fiction settings such as the Knight Rider’s
smart-talking KITT.15 Stephen King’s menacing Christine in
the film of the same name is an extreme example.16 Popular
fiction presents frightening science-fiction versions of
autonomous vehicles that are smarter than their users as
terrifying vehicular “Hals” capable of thinking independently

10. RAY KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR: WHEN HUMANS TRANSCEND
BIOLOGY 7–9 (2005). See infra discussion of the Singularity at note 31.
11. The menacing trucks in the Stephen King movie, Maximum Overdrive,
communicated their demands for diesel in Morse code. MAXIMUM OVERDRIVE
(De Laurentiis Entertainment Group 1986).
12. CARS (Pixar Animation Studios, Walt Disney Pictures Group 2006).
13. CHITTY CHITTY BANG BANG (Warfield Productions 1968).
14. THE LOVE BUG (Walt Disney Productions 1968).
15. KNIGHT RIDER (Universal Media Studios 2008).
16. CHRISTINE (Columbia Pictures 1983) (The title character is an
apparently indistructable 1958 Plymouth Fury consumed by psychotic love for a
young man.)
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and contradicting human commands.17 These are not the
autonomous vehicles discussed in this Article.
In addition, this discussion does not focus on either
robotic or platooned vehicles that are sometimes considered
autonomous vehicles. Robotic vehicles have been in use for
some time in public transit or paratransit applications. They
are programmed by humans to carry out specific repetitive
transport between fixed points—for example, transporting
passengers or cargo to, from, or through highly controlled
environments, such as dedicated lanes or roadways. Among
the oldest of these technologies are guide-rail transit systems
that have been used for ground transport in and around
airports and amusement parks for decades.18 Such robotic
vehicles, pre-programmed by human controllers to operate in
fixed ways, are not autonomous vehicles for the purpose of
this discussion.
Similarly, platooned vehicles are also not the focus of this
privacy discussion. Platoons of wirelessly-connected tightlyspaced vehicles following a lead vehicle19 do not need a driver
in every vehicle because they are controlled by the vehicle
leading the group. Aside from a possible lead vehicle driver,
who makes all of the decisions for the unit, no active driver
control of individual vehicles is needed as the group of
17. Hal was the psychopathic computer in Arthur C. Clarke’s science fiction
novel 2001: A Space Odyssey that overruled the surviving astronaut, Dave. “I’m
sorry, Dave. I’m afraid I can’t do that . . . .” ARTHUR C. CLARKE, 2001: A SPACE
ODYSSEY (1968). Such threats are among the possibilities contemplated by
those concerned about the singularity, when artificial intelligence becomes
smarter than human intelligence.
18. The Denver Airport provides interesting examples of applications of
robotic systems. On the one hand, the automated passenger tram has been a
big success. Denver Airport Tram, VISITING D.C., http://www.visitingdc.com/
airports/denver-airport-tram.asp (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). On the other
hand, the automated baggage system remains an infamous example of a robotic
system that simply did not work. Kirk Johnson, Denver Airport Saw the Future.
It Didn’t Work,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2005, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/27/national/27denver.html?_r=1&pagewanted
=all.
19. Trevor Mogg, Ford Boss: The Self-Driving Car Is Essential—and Coming
Soon, DIGITAL TRENDS (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.digitaltrends.com/cars/fordboss-the-self-driving-car-is-essential-and-coming-soon/.
“Between 2017 and
2025, Ford believes cars will have the technology to reduce the role of the driver
markedly, and that many automobiles will be at least semi-autonomous”
through “ ‘ vehicle platooning’ whereby vehicles proceed pretty much bumper to
bumper through the use of car-mounted sensors. This will improve safety and
save space on roads which will by that time be busier than ever.” Id.
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vehicles moves as a unit or platoon. Both before a vehicle
joins a platoon, as well as after the vehicle has disconnected
from the platoon, each vehicle is not autonomous and requires
a human driver. So long as joining and leaving a platoon is
entirely voluntary and personal information is not collected or
mishandled as a result of platooning, there are likely to be
relatively few privacy issues posed by an unidentified vehicle
voluntarily and temporarily following other presumably
unknown vehicles.
Moreover, vehicles with automated and assistive features
are not the focus of this discussion of privacy and autonomous
vehicles. Already available on conventional motor vehicles,
such features are attractive to consumers because they
enhance safety, comfort, and convenience. At the same time,
these features remain under the driver’s ultimate control.
Rather than being autonomous, in the full sense of selfdriving, vehicles with automated or assistive systems remain
subject to driver decisionmaking and control. The features
are driver assisting, rather than driver eliminating. Even the
most sophisticated of the currently available assistive
systems—such as self-parking, automatic lane alignment,
and adaptive cruise control with automated braking and
acceleration—provide driver override and can usually be
turned on or off by the driver. Motor vehicles can also be
equipped with automated driver warnings and other
automated safety functions.
Many of these automated vehicle technologies are aspects
of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) now widely
adopted throughout the United States and elsewhere in the
world.20 Some of these technologies automate a specific
function in ways that cannot be performed by a driver. For
example, anti-lock brakes pulse a vehicle’s brakes more
rapidly than would be possible for any human driver. Some
of these automated features are required. For example, in
addition to anti-lock breaking systems (ABS), Electronic
Stability Control (ESC) is required for all vehicles built after
20. Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy and Intelligent Transportation, 11 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 151 (1995) discusses many of these ITS
automotive technologies that have been on the road for a long time. For more
recent description of ITS technologies, see generally, Intelligent Transportation
Systems, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.: RESEARCH & INNOVATIVE TECH. ADMIN.,
http://www.its.dot.gov/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2012).
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September 1, 2011 and driven on United States highways.21
These limited automated features do not make the vehicle
autonomous since they do not replace overall control by a
human driver.
The psychological importance of driver control in our
culture is typified by James Bond’s famous cars, specially
engineered by “Q” for Bond’s missions. James Bond’s cars are
automated, but not autonomous, vehicles. Typically, Bond
vehicles are equipped with elegant and powerful automated
and assistive systems. But James himself is always depicted
as in charge of the vehicle, not vice-versa, even when he is not
literally occupying the driver’s seat. Being a super-spy or
superhero seems to require always being in charge of one’s
vehicle.22 Passively being driven around by an autonomous
vehicle just does not fit the active mastery and in-control-atall-times superhero image. The distinction between a driver
who is actively in control of a vehicle, although supported by
automated and assistive systems, as opposed to a passive
passenger controlled by an autonomous vehicle, can be
significant not only for fictional superheroes, but also for
privacy as well.
II. AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE USERS
Although autonomous vehicles will not be for everyone,
the broad range of potential types of autonomous vehicles is
matched by an equally varied spectrum of potential
autonomous vehicle users. Since the role of a person using an
autonomous vehicle is typically passive, driving enthusiasts,
who enjoy driving automobiles for pleasure or for the thrill of
controlling a powerful machine, may not want to use
autonomous vehicles. In contrast, part of the attraction of
autonomous vehicles is the opportunity for an individual, who
would otherwise need to be fully engaged in driving, to do
something else or nothing at all.

21. 49 C.F.R. § 571 (2011) (Standard No. 126: Electronic stability control
systems.)
22. Batman’s “Batmobile” is another example. See, e.g., THE 1966 TV
BATMOBILE, http://www.1966batmobile.com (last visited Apr. 22, 2012); THE
HISTORY OF THE BATMOBILE, http://www.batmobilehistory.com (last visited Apr.
22, 2012).
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At least initially, most autonomous vehicle users will be
licensed drivers.
State legislation allowing autonomous
vehicles on public roads now typically requires a licensed
driver who is capable of taking control of an autonomous
vehicle in an emergency. For example, Nevada, the first state
to license an autonomous vehicle for experimental road use
requires that there be at least two humans in the vehicle and
that one of them must be licensed and capable of driving the
vehicle if necessary.23 Moreover, in the short run at least,
autonomous vehicles will have to share roads and highways
with human-driven vehicles unless and until there are
dedicated roadways for autonomous vehicles.24
Some autonomous vehicle users will likely find a sense of
security in being kept track of when they travel. Such a
“someone is watching over me” message is already a theme in
advertising for such telematics services as General Motors
OnStar.25 For some people, being watched over might feel
comforting.26 However, others would find the same watching
to be oppressive monitoring by an overbearing agent of social
control.27 For example, those who object to red light cameras
reflect this latter attitude of being repelled by indiscriminate
monitoring.28 Of course, to the extent that being monitored is

23. NEV. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, LCB File No. R084-11, Adopted
Regulation of the Department Of Motor Vehicles (2012), available at
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/register/RegsReviewed/$R084-11_ADOPTED.pdf.
NEV. DMV REGULATIONS, LCB File No. R084-11, section 10 (Mar. 1, 2012)
[hereinafter NEV. DMV], available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/register/Regs
Reviewed/$R084-11_ADOPTED.pdf.
24. The near future when there will be a mixture of autonomous and drivercontrolled vehicles, will present substantial challenges in terms of integrating
autonomous vehicle technology into the existing infrastructure.
25. Other examples of similar driver assistance telematics include BMW
Assist, Ford RESCU, Kia UVO, Lexus Link, Lexus Enform, AcuraLink, Honda
InterNavi, Mercedes-Benz TeleAid, Nissan CarWings, Toyota Entune, and
Volvo OnCall. Embedded Telematics in the Automotive Industry, IHS ISUPPLI
10–12 (Nov. 22, 2011), http://gallery.mailchimp.com/e68b454409061ef6bb
1540e01/files/Embedded_Telematics_in_the_Automotive_Industry_sw_iS.pdf
[hereinafter Embedded Telematics].
26. That is one of the major selling points of communications systems such
as OnStar. See, e.g., OnStar, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/onstar.com
(last visited Apr. 22, 2012).
27. The paradigm of such an agent of social control is Big Brother in George
Orwell’s novel, 1984. See generally GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
28. Nathan Koppel, On Red-Light Cameras and the Constitution, WALL ST.
J. L. BLOG (Aug. 25, 2011, 5:35 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/08/25/on-redlight-cameras-and-the-constitution/.
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a matter of informed choice by the person being watched,
choosing to be monitored could be an exercise of personal
autonomy.
For some people, autonomous vehicles could enable more
autonomy than they now have. For example, disabled
persons, the elderly, and those with impaired driving abilities
may find that an autonomous vehicle is just what they want
and need. For these potential users, an autonomous vehicle
would provide enhanced personal autonomy and selfdetermination about when, how, and with whom to travel.
Autonomous vehicles could provide more individual travel
choices than they now enjoy, including the otherwise
unavailable independence of traveling alone.29 Nevertheless,
for such users there may be a trade-off with privacy. Being
linked with an autonomous vehicle is likely to generate a
great deal of personal information about where the user is
and what he or she is doing, as well as a comprehensive log of
places the user visited. For some potential autonomous
vehicle users, relying on an autonomous vehicle could pose a
Hobson’s choice—either to take this autonomous vehicle mode
of personal transport that tracks your every movement, or to
have no individual vehicle mobility at all.
For persons ineligible to drive, including the elderly,
disabled persons, and perhaps children, there is also the risk
that future regimes of autonomous vehicles might exercise
even greater control over individual choices regarding
whether to travel, where to travel, and when to travel. For
example, an interconnected autonomous vehicle subject to
external control by network commands would be able to
prioritize roadway use so that disabled persons, or elderly
persons, or other categories of users might also be required to
travel before or after rush hours. In short, disabled or elderly
persons who care a great deal about their privacy may face
what seems to be a devil’s bargain: In order to reclaim the
ability to travel independently through use of an autonomous
vehicle, a person must compromise privacy by disclosing
personal information and subjecting herself to external

29. As noted earlier, state law autonomous vehicle licensing requirements,
such as those in Nevada (requiring a driverless car to contain at least two
people, one of whom is licensed to take over driving from the vehicle), could
make this hope illusory. See NEV. DMV, supra note 23, at § 10.
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control. As a result, some disabled people have suggested
that, given an autonomous vehicle’s potentially adverse side
effects, they would rather take the bus.
III. PRIVACY INTERESTS
When autonomous vehicles become a common mode of
personal transport, three types of privacy interests will
influence public acceptance of autonomous vehicles and
possibly result in legal restrictions on how autonomous
vehicles can be designed and operated. These three types of
privacy interests are personal autonomy, personal
information, and surveillance. Separate sections address
each of these privacy interests in detail below. Moreover, the
extent to which autonomous vehicles present a context in
which their users reasonably expect privacy is also the
subject of an extended discussion in a separate section. The
moral force of all of these privacy interests, as well as of the
legal privacy rights associated with them, is based on the
dignity of people expected to use autonomous vehicles. These
privacy interests also articulate important political
considerations regarding the impact of autonomous vehicles
on civil liberties and individual freedoms. All of these facets
of privacy play vital roles in a well-functioning civil society as
well as in providing protections for individual liberty. They
are features of individualism and human freedom that face off
against authoritarian dominance or manipulation by
totalitarian states. They are also potentially compatible with
autonomous vehicles.
Conventional legal analysis of privacy commonly splits
privacy interests into two branches: autonomy privacy
interests and information privacy (or data privacy)
interests.30 However, given the nature of autonomous vehicle
technologies, it makes sense to discuss separately
surveillance privacy interests that combine both autonomy

30. This bifurcation is the approach of the California courts in describing
the privacy interests protected under the California Constitution’s guarantee of
an “inalienable right to privacy.” CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (2012). In Hill v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 35 (1994), the court described information
privacy as “interests in precluding the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and
confidential information.” According to the court, autonomy privacy refers to
“interests in making intimate personal decisions or conducting personal
activities without observation, intrusion or interference.” Id.
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and personal information interests.
In the context of
autonomous vehicles, surveillance privacy interests have
added political and psychological significance. Each of these
three types of privacy interests, explored in detail below, will
affect autonomous vehicles in important ways.
A. Personal Autonomy Privacy Interests
Personal autonomy underlies many types of privacy
rights. In an era when discussions about privacy often
emphasize digital personal information and the Internet, this
may seem surprising. With regard to autonomous vehicles,
personal autonomy will be important in decisions whether or
not to choose an autonomous vehicle in the first place.
Personal autonomy is concerned with individual control and
self-determination—people’s abilities to make independent
choices about themselves.
Many individuals identify
psychologically with the vehicles they drive and view their
vehicles as key instruments of personal choice, power, and
control. It is uncertain whether this close identification of
personal autonomy with a person’s vehicle may be different
with regard to use of autonomous vehicles. Were autonomous
vehicles primarily used in car sharing, paratransit, or similar
applications, rather than in an individual’s personal
ownership or exclusive use of a specific vehicle, the intensity
of psychological connection between a personal vehicle and
autonomy could diminish. Nevertheless, some association
between personal mobility and individual autonomy will
undoubtedly remain.
In general, personal autonomy privacy interests focus on
an individual’s ability to control such matters as who knows
where she is now, where will she go next, when she will
depart, how she will get there and with whom, as well as who
can predict or decide where, when, and how she will travel in
the future. The idea of autonomous people using autonomous
vehicles is verbally puzzling, in part because autonomy
appears twice. One can imagine a struggle over which
autonomy will ultimately prevail—the human’s or the
vehicle’s?31

31. This discussion of autonomy is concerned with different issues from
those posed by the Singularity, a future in which artificial intelligence
surpasses human intelligence and overrides human autonomy. The Singularity
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Superficially, autonomy relationships between drivers
and autonomous vehicles may appear to be relentlessly
inverse—a zero-sum relationship in which the greater the
autonomy of the vehicle, the less autonomy is available for
the driver, or vice-versa. However, such a view mistakenly
assumes that autonomy relationships between vehicles and
users are necessarily binary. Rather than requiring all or
nothing control, as used in this context autonomy refers to
independence with regard to choices and decisions. So long as
each autonomous decisionmaker independently chooses a
decision, it does not matter that numerous other
decisionmakers arrive at the same decision. It is also
important that autonomy can be delegated to agents. The
format of such delegations can range from a formal legal
power of attorney to simply asking someone else to pick up
unspecified ingredients for dinner at the grocery store.
As used here, the word “autonomy” is based on an
ancient Greek concept that combined “auto,” meaning “self,”
with “nomos,” meaning “law.” They expressed this idea as
“autonomia,” a word that literally meant “self-law” and
signified to the ancient Greeks “giving oneself one’s own
law.”32 Autonomy was associated with the authenticity of a
person as the author of that person’s own actions33 as well as
with a concept of free will that is essential for personal

involves “[s]marter-than-human intelligence, faster-than-human intelligence,
and self-improving intelligence.” The Singularity focuses on “technologies
which, if they reached a threshold level of sophistication, would enable the
creation of smarter-than-human intelligence.”
What Is the Singularity?,
SINGULARITY INST. FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, http://singinst.org/overview/
whatisthesingularity/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2012).
In such a scenario
autonomous vehicles might pose serious existential risk to human beings. In
discussing “How could an Intelligence Explosion be useful?,”
Luke
Muehlhauser discusses how “humanity faces several existential risks in the
21st century, including global nuclear war, bioweapons, superviruses, and
more.”
Muehlhauser does not mention autonomous
vehicles.
Luke
Muehlhauser, SINGULARITY FAQ, SINGULARITY INST. FOR ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE, Sec. 3.2, http://singinst.org/singularityfaq (last visited Apr. 22,
2012). Nevertheless, if future autonomous vehicles are safer, cleaner, and more
reliable than any human, the government might prohibit all driver control and
therby eliminate by regulation a major aspect of human autonomy.
32. Autonomia, n., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (Oxford
Univ. Press).
33. ARISTOTLE, Book II, in NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, at § 4, available at
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.2.ii.html (last visited Apr. 24,
2012).
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responsibility. The Stoics and Epicurus are credited with
shaping the ancient concept of autonomy into something like
the modern sense of self-determination that remains
fundamental to personal responsibility.34 Thomas Aquinas35
and Emanuel Kant36 further explored this ancient notion of
autonomy in their theories of individual agency and moral
responsibility.
Of course, applying autonomy to a non-human vehicle is
shamelessly anthropomorphic. That is also true of many
modern uses of autonomy, such as autonomous republics and
autonomous under-sea (or Mars) rovers, as well as
autonomous vehicles. Autonomy privacy interests, including
self-determination, choice, and self-control, reflect the older
individual-centered concept of autonomy as an attribute of a
person’s moral self.
As applied to autonomous vehicles, individual autonomy
contemplates delegation of some choices to the vehicle while
others are retained by the individual user. Autonomous
vehicles can be considered agents, tasked with making
particular assigned choices or decisions limited to certain
matters. For example, the vehicle may control specific
functions (such as choice of speed or route) but be required to
follow other choices (such as the destination or when to start)
made by an individual human user. In many instances,
human choices and vehicular choices will turn out to be
congruent or overlapping.
A human individual’s choice to use an autonomous
vehicle is an exercise of individual autonomy. As a result,
autonomous vehicle users will almost certainly determine the
purpose or goal of a journey. That decision could be followed
by a choice to “delegate” to the autonomous vehicle aspects of
how the journey is to be accomplished. In such a scenario, the
autonomous vehicle would be seen as subordinate to the user
as the user’s chosen agent and an instrument of the user’s
decisions. An autonomous vehicle could be given the power to
make the more granular or technical decisions. After all,
34. THE ESSENTIAL EPICURUS: LETTERS, PRINCIPAL DOCTRINES, VATICAN
SAYINGS, AND FRAGMENTS (Eugene O’Connor, trans., Prometheus Books 1993).
35. THOMAS AQUINAS, BASIC WRITINGS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, (A. C.
Pegis, ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1997).
36. IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (L. W. Beck,
trans., Macmillan Publishing Co. 3d ed. 1993).
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autonomous vehicles are “vehicles”37 used in instrumental
ways to accomplish transportation tasks chosen and
ultimately controlled by humans.
In many situations
involving autonomous vehicles, decisionmaking will be
blended. A human user may delegate operational choices to
vehicle technologies, but retain overall transportation “goals”
and high-level choices.
In the context of autonomous vehicles, four aspects of
autonomy privacy will have special importance: control,
choice, intrusion protection, and anonymity. These features
of personal autonomy also interrelate in interesting ways
with both personal information and surveillance privacy
interests that will be discussed below. Historically, legal
rights to autonomy have been associated with control over
intimate personal choices, such as decisions regarding
contraception38 and abortion.39 Today, autonomy privacy laws
also require respect for less intimate individual choices.
When individual choices are compiled into a consumer profile,
this profile can be used as an unchosen “stand-in” for, or alter
ego of, an individual. Indeed, future transactions may treat
this profile as more real than the actual individual.40 Such
profiling interferes with choice and compromises autonomy by
interfering with a person’s self-definition. Such an autonomy
privacy right to self-definition is sometimes also the focus of
privacy tort actions, as well as privacy statutes and
regulations.41 Moreover, since one’s location partly defines
one’s identity, the capacity of autonomous vehicles to
locate users could pose hazards for autonomy privacy by
influencing users’ decisions about where to go. Physical and
psychological intrusions by censors or snoopers can also
interfere with personal autonomy.42 Being able to drive

37. The word, “vehicle,” comes from the Latin vehiculum, meaning an
instrument designed or used to transport people or cargo. See Vehicle, n.,
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
38. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
39. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Feb. 16, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/
shopping-habits.html.
41. See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940); Melvin v.
Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285 (1931).
42. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (involving the seizure of
obscene film from a person’s home). Justice Marshall insisted that the:
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anonymously is a choice that is part of autonomy privacy.
Legal protections for this choice to be anonymous include the
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act.
This federal statute
prohibits unpermitted disclosure of driver and vehicle
licensing records from state departments of motor vehicles to
identify a person.43
A functional view of autonomy privacy describes it as
operating in two ways—positive and negative.44 The positive
side of autonomy privacy involves a person’s freedom to take
action and affirmatively to do something, such as make
choices. In contrast, negative autonomy privacy involves an
individual’s
freedom
from
external
interferences.
Autonomous vehicles will affect both types of autonomy
privacy.
Positive autonomy refers to an individual’s abilities to
take autonomous action and to make autonomous choices.
The famous Warren and Brandeis article that launched
modern legal concepts of a right to privacy described the
positive aspect of autonomy in connection with protecting “the
conduct of a noble life.”45 Positive autonomy includes an
individual’s ability to control that individual’s own
personality as well as the ability to make decisions about
interacting with others,46 to travel or to stay home.47 Over the

Right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social
worth, is fundamental to our free society . . . . [T]he right to be free,
except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental
intrusions into a person’s privacy . . . . If the First Amendment means
anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting
alone in his own house, what books he may read or films he may
watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of
giving government the power to control men’s minds.
Id. at 564–65.
43. See Drivers’ Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725 (2012). The
statute has a number of exceptions such as for law enforcement uses.
44. Modern concepts of autonomy are reflected in the duality of freedom.
See ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY (1958); see also E. GOFFMAN,
BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES 3–12 (1963); E. GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF
SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959). See generally Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE
L.J. 475, 475–82 (1968).
45. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193, 207 (1890).
46. Id. at 196, 219–20.
47. Justice William O. Douglas described various zones of privacy, in which
an outermost privacy zone protects an individual’s “freedom to walk, stroll, or
loaf.” Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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last century, court decisions protecting positive autonomy
privacy often focused on an individual’s rights to control one’s
own life choices and to make highly personal decisions,
particularly with regard to intimate matters, such as sex and
procreation.48 However, much more mundane activities than
sex and procreation are also facets of positive autonomy
privacy. For example, concerns about positive autonomy
privacy motivate the Federal Trade Commission’s ongoing
efforts to deal with online behavioral advertising.49 This
positive side of autonomy privacy also applies to
transportation choices, including an individual’s right to
determine where to go, how to get there, and when to travel.50
In the future, when a person chooses either to drive or to use
an autonomous vehicle, such a choice will be an exercise of
positive autonomy.
The negative side of autonomy privacy was famously
characterized by Warren and Brandeis as “the right to be let
alone.”51
Negative autonomy privacy means that an
individual can prevent access to the individual. It empowers
the individual to prevent or avoid external influences,
interferences, or meddling.52 The resulting state of noninterference is negative autonomy privacy. This negative side

48. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973).
49. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE: INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COMMERCIAL
DATA PRIVACY AND INNOVATION IN THE INTERNET ECONOMY: A DYNAMIC
POLICY FRAMEWORK (2010), available at http://www.commerce.gov/sites/de
fault/files/documents/2010/december/iptf-privacy-green-paper.pdf; FED. TRADE
COMM’N, REPORT: PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE
(2012),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326pri
vacyreport.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2012). See also In the Matter of Google Inc.,
F.T.C. Docket No. C-4336 (Oct. 13, 2011).
50. The informal anthem for positive transportation autonomy might be the
refrain:
You gotta go where you wanna go,
Do what you wanna do
With whoever you wanna do it with.
JOHN PHILIPS, GO WHERE YOU WANNA GO (Lou Adler 1965). This song was
made famous by “The Mamas & the Papas” on their album “If You Can Believe
Your Eyes and Ears” from 1966. THE MAMAS & THE PAPAS, IF YOU CAN
BELIEVE YOUR EYES AND EARS (Lou Adler 1966).
51. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 45, at 195.
52. In the original argument for recognizing a right of privacy in the United
States the principle of “an inviolate personality” was one of Brandeis’s
descriptions of negative autonomy. Id. at 205; see also Dorothy J. Glancy, The
Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 21–28 (1979).
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of autonomy protects an individual’s positive freedom to make
independent decisions “without observation, intrusion, or
Many privacy laws protect individuals
interference.”53
against unwanted interferences with negative autonomy.
Examples include statutes that protect people against
cyberstalking54 and spam.55 Whether autonomous vehicles
will be instruments that facilitate intrusion or will be
equipped to prevent intrusion will depend on how
autonomous vehicles are designed and built.56 For example,
autonomous vehicle users could be treated as captive
audiences for location-based targeted advertising as they
drive from place to place. On the road, autonomous vehicles
could also be designed to screen out such unwanted
interferences. Safeguarding individual autonomy against
governmental encroachment is a central purpose of the Bill of
Rights to the United States Constitution.57
Legal protections against interferences with autonomy
privacy in the context of autonomous vehicles are likely to
focus on several objectives. These objectives include (1)
protecting user decisionmaking and control over whether and
how an autonomous vehicle is used, (2) requiring respect for a
user’s choice and consent with regard to both vehicle
operation and information autonomous vehicle travel, and (3)
preventing intrusions including unwanted sensory inputs,
such as advertising thrust on an individual using an
autonomous vehicle.
53. Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 35 (1994).
Psychological distress from powerlessness, lack of control over one’s situation is
said to be among the most severe deprivations associated with incarceration
and institutionalization.
54. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.7 (2011); CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (2011).
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, at least thirty-four
states have enacted similar legislation.
National Conference of State
Legislatures (NCSL), State Cyberstalking and Cyberharassment Laws,
NCSJ.ORG (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom
/cyberstalking-and-cyberharassment-laws.aspx.
55. The CAN-SPAM ACT, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701−7713 (2012).
56. In court decisions, negative autonomy privacy rights against intrusion
have ranged from rights not to be bombarded by unwanted information, e.g.
Pub. Utilities Comm’n. v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), to physical intrusions
(such as trespass or physical searches) to capturing personal communications
and personal information. Tort law provides for damage actions for intrusion,
appropriation, public disclosure and for false light. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 158, 217, 223, 652E (1977).
57. U.S. CONST. amends. I−X (2012)
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Many autonomy privacy issues can be avoided by
securing individual users’ affirmative choice and consent.
However, such consent has to be fully informed to be effective.
Because of the complicated technological nature of
autonomous vehicles, securing informed individual consent to
interferences with user autonomy may be difficult. A major
challenge for autonomous vehicle developers will be to make
sophisticated technical information about the consequences of
using these vehicles understandable by potential users.
A particularly useful way to avoid autonomy privacy
problems is through anonymity. Since people sometimes
want or need to travel without others knowing when and
where they are going, anonymity is likely to be an important
choice required by people considering use of an autonomous
vehicle. For interconnected autonomous vehicles, assuring
anonymity will pose a special challenge. For example,
anonymous travel in interconnected autonomous vehicles
may raise security concerns about being able to trace
misbehaving technology, or to find antisocial activity or to
prosecute individuals responsible for unlawful network
activities. Nevertheless, as the United States Supreme Court
recently recognized, the ability to choose anonymous personal
mobility is important for a society that seeks to avoid
authoritarianism.58
B. Personal Information Privacy Interests
Autonomous vehicles are likely to generate a great deal
of data. Some of that data will be personal information
because it is associated with individual people. As a result,
appropriately coping with large amounts of personal
information will pose major challenges for autonomous
vehicles. Potential autonomous vehicle users are likely to be
reluctant to allow their personal information to be collected or
used without knowing what will happen to that information
and what the consequences are for the users themselves.
Personal information privacy interests related to autonomous
vehicles would include such matters as where, when, and how
a person moves from geographical place to place, what uses
are made of such personal data, why it is being collected, how

58. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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it will be used, how long it will be kept, and who will and will
not have access to it.
The present location of an autonomous vehicle user, that
person’s past travel patterns and his or her future travel
plans are among the personal information likely to be
associated with autonomous vehicles. Such information can
be used to annoy an individual user through targeted
marketing and advertising. It can also be used to harass an
individual through following, stopping and questioning her,
or even stealing her identity. Stalkers can use this type of
personal information to frighten or harm people. Government
agencies, including law enforcement and intelligence
agencies, will seek to use personal information from
autonomous vehicles to find suspicious individuals for further
investigation or to prosecute suspects based on autonomous
vehicle data. Personal information from autonomous vehicles
about a user’s past locations will also be used to predict where
the individual is most likely to be found in the future.
Moreover, personal information from autonomous
vehicles can be correlated with other information. For
example, the location where the vehicle is regularly parked
overnight (e.g., in a high-income residential neighborhood)
could be used to profile the likely user (e.g., as wealthy) and
to predict the user’s actions (e.g., likely to shop at high-end
retail shops). The profile could also be used to manipulate
user choices such as where to travel (e.g., through
advertisements for expensive resorts) or to eat (e.g.,
enticements to visit a five-star restaurant in the next town).
Personal information from autonomous vehicles can also be
used as part of an individual’s data profile that is used as a
surrogate for the individual person. 59 At a much larger scale,

59. Alexis Madrigal described this issue as “the leading edge of a much
bigger discussion about the relationship between our digital and physical selves
. . . . [It] may end up determining who you are when viewed by a bank or a
romantic partner or a retailer who sells shoes.” Alexis Madrigal, I’m Being
Followed: How Google—and 104 Other Companies—Are Tracking Me on the
Web,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Feb.
29,
2012),
available
at
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/12/02/im-being-followed-how
-google-and-104-other-companies-are-tracking-me-on-the-web/253758/.
The
European Data Directive, now under revision, treats personal information as a
sort of alterego of the information’s subject, with important dignitary and
human-rights-based interests at stake. Directive 95/46/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of
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collection of comprehensive personal information from all
autonomous vehicles could result in concentration of
information about and power over large numbers of
individuals that would pose troublesome political issues.
The United States Supreme Court has raised
constitutional concerns about trapping people by secretly
collecting personal information without the knowledge or
consent of the people involved.60 Personal data retained
indefinitely beyond the awareness of the person who is the
subject of the information is a nightmare scenario.61 In the
legal realm, aversion to collection and use of personal
information by unseen data collectors on the Internet has led
to calls for restrictions on such collection of personal
information.62 Government officials, at both state and federal
levels, have suggested legal measures to restrict this type of
collection of personal information on line.63 On the road,
covert collection of personal information from autonomous
vehicles can pose similar problems. Indeed, the United States
Supreme Court recognized the problem of tracking people on
the road when it unanimously held that tracking a suspect by
placing an unseen GPS device on the suspect’s vehicle is
unconstitutional without a warrant.64
Developers of
autonomous vehicles are in the fortunate position of being
aware of these personal information issues in advance, so
that autonomous vehicles can appropriately minimize
personal data collection.
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, EURLEX (Oct. 24, 1995), http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML.
60. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 95557 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Id. at 96263
(Alito, J., concurring).
61. FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL, (Mike Mitchell, trans., Oxford World’s
Classics 2009).
62. Julie Brill, Big Data, Big Issues, FTC.GOV available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/brill/120228fordhamlawschool.pdf (last visited Apr.
24, 2012).
63. Id.; THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED
WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION
GLOBAL
DIGITAL
ECONOMY,
available
at
IN
THE
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf
[hereinafter
WHITE HOUSE PRIVACY REPORT] (last visited Apr. 24, 2012); Press Release,
Kamala D. Harris, Office of the Attorney Gen. of the State of Cal., Joint
Statement of Principles with Amazon.com Inc. (Feb. 22, 2012), available at
http://www.ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/press/pdfs/n2630_signed_agreement.pdf.
64. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
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1. Autonomous Vehicle Personal Information
Autonomous vehicles will produce and use many types of
personal information, such as origin-destination data and
real-time location information. Since autonomous vehicles
remain experimental, there is no comprehensive catalogue of
all of the personal information that may be collected by
autonomous vehicles. Detailed behavioral data regarding
users of autonomous vehicles, as well as real-time and
historic data about an identified autonomous vehicle user’s
movements in physical space are potential examples.
Destination decisions of autonomous vehicle users, as well as
the time, place, and circumstances of when such travel
decisions are made, reflect the personalities, behavior, and
personal preferences of the people associated with these
decisions.
Standards that specify data elements that
autonomous vehicles will collect, use, record, or transmit have
not yet been adopted.65 When these standards are adopted,
personal information requirements, such as requiring that
information about autonomous vehicle users be anonymous,
should be part of them.
Travel patterns of autonomous vehicle users will likely be
among the most valuable of the personal information
associated with any type of autonomous vehicle.66 Personal
information about a user’s present and past locations,
activities, and frequent destinations are examples. In the
selfcontained autonomous vehicle, retrospective information
related to the user could be logged within the vehicle itself.
In the interconnected version of autonomous vehicles, this
type of data would be transmitted more or less continuously
to and through the network. As a result, location data would
be available to pinpoint and keep track of the vehicle user,

65. The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) has appointed a committee
to come up with standards for roadway autonomous vehicles. But these
standards are not yet available and do not appear to address personal
information. See On-Road Autonomous Vehicle Standards Committee, SAE
STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT, http://www.sae.org/servlets/works/customer.do (last
visited Apr. 22, 2012).
66. For example, experimental models of selfcontained autonomous vehicles,
that rely on the vehicle’s own sensors for roadway data, require that the journey
be patterned in advance by human drivers. Such patterning records how the
vehicle is driven by a human driver along the route to be autonomously driven
later by the vehicle. Connected to a user such a pattern is personal information.
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both in real-time and over time.67 Transmitting this personal
information through a network, as is the design of
interconnected autonomous vehicles, would make locating an
autonomous vehicle user in real time relatively easy for
anyone with access to the network.
Once patterns of frequent travel have been recorded
(either by the network for the interconnected autonomous
vehicle or within the selfcontained autonomous vehicle), that
information can be used to reconstruct a person’s past travel
and to predict the individual’s future destinations. Mobile
systems that collect, digitize, and transmit information about
a person’s present and past locations and travel patterns are
already criticized as presenting a serious problem for
personal information privacy. As a result, they have been
targeted by lawsuits and regulatory initiatives.68 The sharp
and negative reaction to physical tracking by mobile devices
is indicative of how sensitive personal information associated
with autonomous vehicles is likely to be.
All sorts of potential data users will be interested in
autonomous vehicle user information.
In addition to
autonomous
vehicle
developers
and
transportation
researchers, entities engaged in marketing, advertising, and
political persuasion, as well as law enforcement and
intelligence agencies, would all find autonomous vehicle user
data highly valuable. For example, vehicle miles traveled by
a person on particular roadways could be collected
automatically by an autonomous vehicle to provide the basis
for charging for use of highways as well as to provide
information about roadway demand and performance to land
use and transportation planning agencies. In addition, if
made available to marketing and advertising agencies, such
personal data could also be used to advertise local retail
opportunities or to manipulate autonomous vehicle users’
decisions about where to shop. Political candidates already

67. Concurring opinions in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012),
addressed this issue at 95556 (Sotomayor, J.) and at 963 (Alito, J., concurring).
68. Al Franken, Privacy and Civil Liberties in the Digital Age, WIRED, Mar.
2, 2012, available at http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2012/03/opinion-frankenprivacyliberties/; Chris Foresman, Google Faces $50 Million Lawsuit over
TECHNICA,
available
at
Android
Location
Tracking,
ARS
http://www.arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/04/google-faces-50-millionlawsuit-over-android-location-tracking (last visited Apr. 22, 2012).
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use personal demographics and travel patterns in, for
example, “commuter issues” campaigns.
One strategy for avoiding problems associated with
personal information is to rely on anonymous information
instead.
For autonomous vehicle purposes, that would
require separating information about the vehicle itself from
information linked to an individual person and not collecting
the latter. Anonymous information derived from autonomous
vehicles should be sufficient for such uses as transportation
planning, traffic management and the like. The challenge
will be to maintain the anonymity of this information, which
often gains value when linked to an identifiable person.
Unfortunately, there is no permanent, solid divide separating
anonymous data from personal information. When linked to
an individual human person, such as an autonomous vehicle
user or owner, the vehicle data easily becomes personal
information.69
Data mining and relational database
techniques can provide such linkage and re-identify
seemingly anonymous information as referring to a particular
identifiable individual. For example, linking together a
database of anonymous aggregated information with other
databases can identify a particular individual or set of
individuals.70 That is why simply removing identifiers or
even aggregating de-identified personal information from a
number of individuals is usually not sufficient to maintain
anonymity. Instead, summarizing data so that particular
data records no longer exist is the best way to assure that
anonymity continues and that personal information is not
subject to misuse.
If personal information is collected about autonomous
vehicle users, those users deserve an opportunity actively to
consent or not to consent to such personal data collection. As
noted earlier, securing consent from individuals to collection

69. When autonomous vehicles operating without human drivers are rare,
the very presence of the autonomous vehicle on the road may be sufficient to
link it with a very limited category of autonomous vehicle owners. The vehicle
make and model, as well as perhaps the location where it is seen would likely
reveal the owner. Such linkage to an individual results in what had been
anonymous information about an autonomous vehicle becoming personal
information about the autonomous vehicle’s user. See also NEV. DMV, infra
note 74, regarding requiring special license plates for autonomous vehicles.
70. Brill, supra note 62.
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or use of personal information derived from autonomous
vehicles poses a challenging problem because the technologies
involved in autonomous vehicles are likely to be difficult for
most potential users to understand. Nevertheless, whenever
personal information is collected, used, stored, or shared,
informed consent from the person involved is likely to be
required.
2. Personal Information Regulation
Personal information, such as that likely to be associated
with autonomous vehicles, is regulated by an increasing
number of state and federal statutes and regulations that
govern collection and use, as well as prohibit misuse of
personal information. There are also industry standards
regarding appropriate practices with regard to personal
information.
An example of existing state personal information laws
that would apply to personal information from autonomous
vehicles are statutes requiring notification of missing or lost
personal information—privacy breaches. Forty-six states, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands
have enacted such legislation that requires notification and
remedial action if personal information is lost or disclosed
through a data breach.71 Since the specifics of these data
breach laws vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,
autonomous vehicles operating in more than one state could
be subject to privacy breach laws of several different states.
A number of states, such as Massachusetts, follow their
residents’ personal information and protect it, wherever the
data moves geographically.72
A federal statute regulates one type of personal
information likely to be associated with autonomous
vehicles—driver and vehicle licensing information.
The

71. See Security Breach Legislation 2011, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES
(Dec.
21,
2011),
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/
telecom/security-breach-legislation-2011.aspx.
Some states also provide
additional protection with regard to vehicle and driver licensing information
under state statutes and regulations.
72. Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act , MASS. G.L. ch. 93A (2011) and
201 CMR 17.0117.05 (Massachusetts Standards for the Protection of Personal
Information of Residents of the Commonwealth) (2012).
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Drivers’ Privacy Protection Act73 (DPPA) applies nationwide
to personal information required and processed by state
departments of motor vehicles for licensing purposes. The
DPPA imposes statutory damages for improper use or
disclosure of personal information provided for the purposes
of licensing drivers and vehicles.
The statute protects
specified categories of personal information, such as name
and address, and provides even more protection for highly
sensitive personal information, such as race. So far, the only
state that registers autonomous vehicles is Nevada, where
autonomous vehicles will be required to display distinctive
red or green number plates.74
In addition, Nevada
regulations require a special driver’s license endorsement for
“a person who holds a driver’s license in this State and wishes
to operate an autonomous vehicle in autonomous mode in this
State.”75
In addition to federal Constitutional Bill of Rights
protections against government intrusion discussed below,76
federal statutes such as the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA)77 and the Federal Communications Act78
will apply to certain aspects of autonomous vehicle
communications, particularly in interconnected versions of
autonomous vehicles. Moreover, to the extent that federal
agencies collect or receive information about identifiable
users of autonomous vehicles, the Privacy Act of 1974 would
apply.79
There seems to be a significant potential for legislation
and regulation that specifically focuses on personal
information derived from autonomous vehicles.
Such
legislation is illustrated by experience with what is called
Event Data Recorder (EDR) statutes. Beginning almost ten
years ago, a number of states began to enact legislation to
restrict access to information recorded by EDRs.80 For
73. Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2012).
74. NEV. DMV, supra note 23.
75. Id. at § 5.1. The autonomous vehicle driver’s license requires a “G”
endorsement.
76. U.S. CONST, amends. I–X. See discussion infra Part IV.
77. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012).
78. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2012).
79. The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012).
80. By 2010 at least thirteen states had enacted legislation specifying
specific privacy protections for EDRs. 2009-12 Privacy Legislation Related to

GLANCY FINAL

2012]

11/15/2012 8:46 PM

PRIVACY IN AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES

1203

example, California Vehicle Code section 9951 applies to any
new motor vehicle manufactured on or after July 1, 2004 that
is sold or leased in California and is “equipped with one or
more recording devices commonly referred to as ‘event data
recorders (EDR)’ or ‘sensing and diagnostic modules
(SDM).’ ” 81 Not only must the EDR be disclosed in the owner’s
manual, access to personal data derived from these devices
requires either consent by the vehicle’s owner or a court
order. The California statute also specifically requires that
telematics subscription services disclose their capacity to
record or transmit vehicle diagnostic information as part of
their subscription services. Although directed at EDRs and
SDMs, this statute will directly apply to autonomous vehicles
insofar as they use recording devices similar to EDRs or
SDMs. This statute also may potentially apply to other types
of vehicle data logging, for example by a selfcontained
autonomous vehicle.
In part to provide a modicum of national uniformity, the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
promulgated extensive regulations standardizing EDRs and
EDR data as well as requiring special disclosure language
regarding EDRs in vehicle owners’ manuals.82 By the time
autonomous vehicles are rolled out as consumer products,
there may be changes in the regulatory status of the internal
vehicle sensor information currently associated with EDRs.
For example, the United States Department of
Transportation may decide to standardize internal vehicle
sensor information and to require that it be transmitted
through a Connected Vehicle network. If so, protection of
personal information transmitted through such a network
would need to be addressed.
3. Personal Information Privacy Risks
Autonomous vehicles can pose a variety of risks to
personal information privacy. To the extent that autonomous
vehicles rely on anonymous information and do not generate

Event Data Recorders (“Black Boxes”) in Vehicles, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/
event-data-recorder-quotblack-boxes-quot-legi.aspx.
81. CAL. VEH. CODE § 9951(a) (2012).
82. 49 C.F.R. §§ 563.1–563.12 (2011).
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or use personal information, they will avoid many of these
risks. Simply not having personal information—through
limiting personal information collection and not retaining
personal information that has been collected—helps to
minimize these risks.
To the extent that autonomous vehicles do generate
personal information, disclosure or transmission of that
information to others aggravates privacy risks. In addition to
simple loss or improper disclosure of personal data, access to
personal information through legal process is easier when
such information is held by someone other than the data
subject. For example, constitutional protections do not apply
to law enforcement and national security officials when they
seek access to personal information, not from the person, but
from others who have the personal information.83 Under the
“Third Party Doctrine,” a readily available subpoena, court
order, or administrative order, often without notice to the
data subject, can provide relatively easy access to personal
data in the hands of someone other than the person who is
the subject of the personal information.84 No warrant or
probable cause finding is required. Because this “Third Party
Doctrine” circumvents constitutional privacy protection,
which would otherwise require a judicial warrant for
government access to the same personal information held by
the data subject, information privacy risks are magnified.
Personal information derived from autonomous vehicles also
would be potentially available to civil litigants and private
investigators, in such cases as divorce actions and vehicle
accident litigation. If personal information is transmitted by
autonomous vehicles to other persons and entities, encryption
and data security measures as well as confidentiality
agreements and requirements will only be partly successful in
protecting the privacy of autonomous vehicle personal
information.
Different types of autonomous vehicles will pose different
types of risks to personal information. The two versions of
83. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735 (1979).
84. Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV.
561 (2009); see also In re Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), Misc. Nos. 1:11–DM–3, 10–GJ–3793, 1:11–EC–3, 2011
WL5508991 (E.D. Va. Nov. 10, 2011).
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autonomous vehicles (selfcontained and interconnected)
described earlier 85 will deal with personal information about
users in different ways.
In general, more personal
information will probably be at greater risk in the
interconnected type of autonomous vehicle than in the
The fact that interconnected
selfcontained version. 86
autonomous vehicles rely on wireless communications to
exchange information with other vehicles and network users
accounts for some of these privacy risks.
Since an
interconnected vehicle constantly communicates with the
network for situational information and guidance, a user’s
locations and decisions regarding destinations and changes in
route would be automatically and continuously available
through the network. Moreover, the device identifiers of
interconnected autonomous vehicles will likely make all data
communicated by interconnected autonomous vehicles at
least potentially personal information, unless the device
identifiers have been anonomyzed. Even with anonymous
device identifiers, any personal information transmitted by
the vehicle through a communications network could be
vulnerable to unpermitted access unless the data is encrypted
and the network is very secure.
As a result, in an
interconnected autonomous vehicle, personal information
would need to be robustly anonomyzed, strongly encrypted,
and securely protected to avoid being vulnerable to access,
use, and sharing within the network by other network users,
the
network’s
controlling
entity,
or
unauthorized
87
In the end, privacy risks to users of
interlopers.
interconnected autonomous vehicles would largely depend on
how the network connecting interconnected autonomous
vehicles is designed, managed, and operated.
In contrast, the selfcontained autonomous vehicle does
not use wireless communications and is not connected to a
network. Instead, the selfcontained autonomous vehicle
relies on its own outward-facing sensors for information about
driving conditions and roadway situations. Such a vehicle
85. See supra Part I.A–B.
86. Of course most autonomous vehicles will combine these types of
artificial intelligence. However, considering these types as models will help in
seeing some of the differences autonomous vehicle design makes with regard to
personal information privacy.
87. Wood, et al., supra note 8 at 1462–64.
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relies on its own inward-facing sensors for internal vehiclerelated data. As a result, the vehicle itself could become a
concentrated repository of all sorts of personal information,
including a user’s travel patterns, highly detailed behavioral
information, and perhaps the activities of people outside the
vehicle within range of the vehicle’s sensors. Although less
useful for real-time remote tracking of its user, a
selfcontained autonomous vehicle could nevertheless hold
retrospective personal information such as highly detailed
information about its past locations as well as interactions
between the vehicle and its user. The privacy risks would
come from unauthorized access to stored, in-vehicle personal
information both about the user and about everyone and
everything the vehicle has encountered. Strong security
measures—from intense physical security to data encryption
and access authentication—would be essential for protecting
the privacy of personal information generated by
selfcontained autonomous vehicles. Using force or falsehoods
to gain the user’s consent to access personal information
contained in the autonomous vehicle would present yet
another category of privacy risk.
Appropriate design of autonomous vehicles can of course
minimize risks to personal information.88 Use of anonymous
information, rather than personal information, can provide
additional protection against risks to personal information
privacy interests described here. Assuring that autonomous
vehicles only collect, transmit, or use personal information
with the knowledge and informed consent of the person using
the autonomous vehicle, will also be important to reducing
privacy risks in all types of autonomous vehicles.
C.

Surveillance Privacy Interests

Surveillance privacy interests respond to people’s
aversion to being constantly watched, tracked or monitored as
they travel from place to place.
At the same time,
surveillance privacy interests also reflect political and
philosophical opposition to pervasive scrutiny of everyone
who travels, particularly if that scrutiny is controlled by
government.
These underlying political implications of
88. See discussion infra Part V (regarding optimizing privacy and
autonomous vehicle interactions).
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surveillance are sometimes captured by the age-old question:
“Who watches the watchmen?”89 In fact the challenge of
keeping in check those who have concentrated knowledge
about how people live their lives and move about in the world
seems even more intense in the digital twenty-first century.
Use of autonomous vehicles for surveillance purposes,
could compromise something more than just autonomy and
personal information privacy interests of individuals. Indeed,
surveillance using autonomous vehicles could threaten the
political and social well-being of our society. As Supreme
Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor noted in her concurring
opinion in United States v. Jones, “Awareness that the
Government may be watching chills associational and
expressive freedoms. And the Government’s unrestrained
power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity
is susceptible to abuse.”90 She also pointed out that “making
available at a relatively low cost such a substantial quantum
of intimate [GPS location] information about any person
whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to
track,” may “ ‘ alter the relationship between citizen and
government in a way that is inimical to democratic
society.’ ” 91
Surveillance privacy interests reflect these
societal concerns about the importance of individual privacy
as the foundation of a free society.
Surveillance is a relatively modern idea. Even the word,
“surveillance,” is fairly new to the English language. It was
borrowed from the French by the British at the turn of the
nineteenth century to refer to looking over an area, usually
from a high place, for strategic information about a battlefield
or prospective confrontation.92
Early in the twentieth
century, surveillance usually suggested use of technology to
enhance human abilities to see over wide distances to collect
comprehensive information about an adversary.93 Since then,
89. This phrase is translated from Latin: “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?”
JUVENAL, SATIRE VI, (ca. 55 AD) lines 347–48.
90. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
91. Id. (citing United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir.
2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)).
92. Surveillance, n., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Oxford Univ. Press 2d
ed. 1989).
93. For example, aerial reconnaissance became a major factor around World
War I. See Nicholas M. Short, Sr., History of Remote Sensing: In the Beginning;
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the word, “surveillance,” has been used in a wide variety of
careful-watching contexts from medical surveillance of
diseases and immune responses, to physical stakeouts of
crime suspects, to mass-scale electronic and network
surveillance for gathering intelligence or for seeking evidence
of anomalous or criminal behavior. Surveillance is also a
psychological technique used to affect human behavior
through pervasive monitoring of activities and areas to
discourage people from violating rules or laws.
Although surveillance most often means covert collection
of information, it can also refer to overt watching aimed at
modifying the behavior of those watched. An example of
overt surveillance is red-light cameras. These devices are
often prominently placed as ever-present watchers at
intersections so that drivers are deterred from entering
intersections while the stoplight is red.94 One purpose of
overt surveillance is to affect the behavior of those being
watched, to assure that individual behavior conforms to
societal norms. If an autonomous vehicle user were informed
that his or her vehicle continuously reports its speed to law
enforcement authorities, that user would be more likely to
direct the vehicle to conform to the speed limit, rather than
exercise personal autonomy in deciding not to conform.95
Similarly, autonomous vehicles could overtly monitor the
behavior of vehicle users so that instances of user activities
such as smoking or drinking alcohol are sensed and recorded.
One purpose of overt surveillance is to interfere with
individual autonomy through the power of scrutiny. Even
potential scrutiny can be sufficient to control behavior, as
Jeremy Bentham suggested in his design for the Panopticon
Prison.96 Such direct, announced interference with personal

Launch Vehicles, FAS.ORG, http://www.fas.org/irp/imint/docs/rst/Intro/Part2
_7.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2012).
94. Koppel, supra note 28.
95. Some insurance companies promote devices that monitor and reward or
punish driver behavior (e.g., speeding, sutten starts or stops, driving at
dangerous times in dangerous places, etc.) in terms of lower or higher insurance
premiums. For example, Progressive Insurance’s SnapShot program urges
drivers to use a tracking device to keep track of driving habits in order to
qualify for a discount.
See Snapshot Common Questions, PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE, available at http://www.progressive.com/auto/snapshot-commonquestions.aspx (last visited Apr. 22, 2012).
96. See MICHAEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE
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autonomy would likely seriously impair trust and confidence
in autonomous vehicles.
As a result, developers of
autonomous vehicles would be unlikely to equip autonomous
vehicles for overt surveillance, unless a government
regulation required it.
Covert surveillance by autonomous vehicles secretly
collecting and reporting personal information seems more
likely. Such surveillance is often conducted remotely so that
it remains hidden from those being monitored. Given the
sophisticated technologies applied in autonomous vehicles,
technically unsophisticated users may not understand an
autonomous vehicle’s potential surveillance capabilities to
collect, store, or share personal information about its user.
These covert surveillance capabilities include both targeted
surveillance of a particular person and mass surveillance of
groups or populations.
1. Targeted Surveillance
Targeted surveillance keeps track of a particular
identified human person, who would otherwise expect to be
let alone, and certainly not to be followed. Such surveillance
nearly always involves surreptitiously collecting detailed
personal information about the targeted individual and
keeping track of the target’s every move. Usually, this type of
information collection is not conducted openly. For example,
assume that an autonomous vehicle generates personal
information about a user’s location in real time without the
user’s knowledge or consent. If communicated beyond the
vehicle, this real-time information would make it possible to
locate the targeted user all of the time, as well as to maintain
a comprehensive record of all the places the user has been.
When this personal information is transmitted or disclosed to
recipients unknown to the target, such surveillance
compromises both autonomy and personal information
privacy interests. This is the type of vehicle tracking that,
because no warrant authorized installation of the tracking
device, was held unconstitutional by the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Jones.97

PRISON (1979).
97. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
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Unless personal information from autonomous vehicle is
encrypted and rendered anonymous, interconnected
autonomous vehicles communicating location and other data
back and forth over a wireless network could be very useful
tools for invisible targeted surveillance.
Absent data
encryption and anonymity, access to an autonomous vehicle
network would enable immediate remote access to the real
time location of an autonomous vehicle and its user. Such
access would also enable collection of longitudinal records of
past locations. As a result, access to the interconnected
autonomous vehicle network, would enable law enforcement,
national security, and other types of public and private
agencies to conduct remote surveillance of the vehicle’s user.
When a third party, such as a network operator, is a
repository of personal information collected through such
surveillance, privacy protection would be even further
compromised.98 This personal information held by third
parties would be available to government and private sector
investigators through subpoenas or administrative orders,
without the target of the surveillance ever knowing that the
information exists. Indeed, law enforcement access to certain
stored personal information from such a network may require
neither probable cause nor a warrant.99
A selfcontained autonomous vehicle could also be tracked
and its user targeted for surveillance in real time. However,
the vehicle itself would not be transmitting the surveillance
information. Unless connected to a network or attached to a
tracking device, a selfcontained autonomous vehicle would
not itself enable remote real-time tracking. However, to the
extent that the vehicle keeps historical information, such as

98. See discussion of Third-Party information supra text accompanying note
83 and infra Part IV. In her concurring opinion in United States v. Jones,
Justice Sotomayor suggested that “it may be necessary to reconsider the
premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956
(Sotomayor, J., concurring); see, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979);
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). Justice Sotomayor also noted,
“This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal
of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out
mundane tasks.” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
99. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 27012712 (2012). See In re
Application of the United States of America for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(d), 830 F. Supp. 2d 114 (E.D. Va. 2011).
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past itineraries, about the surveillance target, that
information could be extracted from the selfcontained
autonomous vehicle by those with access to the computer
systems inside the vehicle. Unlawful access by breaking into
the vehicle would possibly be deterred by burglary and other
laws. Law enforcement extraction of surveillance information
from a selfcontained autonomous vehicle would likely require
at least probable cause as well as a warrant.100
Use of autonomous vehicles comprehensively to keep
track of the whereabouts of a targeted individual in all places
and at all times can exert substantial control over that
individual. Maintaining centralized information about an
individual compromises individual self-determination and
autonomy and can be harmful to the individual’s
psychological health. Comprehensive centralized surveillance
systems concentrated on an individual can also influence the
individual’s future choices by keeping track of each time that
individual visits socially or politically “unacceptable”
locations. The New York Court of Appeals described the
impact of targeted surveillance: “Disclosed in [tracking] data
. . . will be trips the indisputably private nature of which
takes little imagination to conjure: trips to the psychiatrist,
the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment
center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the bythe-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or
church, the gay bar and on and on.”101
Targeted surveillance compromises an important aspect
of individual autonomy—the ability to resist being
categorized, manipulated psychologically, intimidated, or
mechanistically predicted by society or the government.
When an individual is subject to being constantly watched,
that person does not feel free to question or to oppose those in
charge of the surveillance system.
2. Mass Surveillance
Mass
surveillance
comprehensive collection

involves
indiscriminate
of personal information

and
from

100. See discussion of Fourth Amendment issues infra Part IV.
101. People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 441–42 (2009). Justice Sotomayor
quoted this passage in her concurring opinion in Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 946,
95556.
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everyone within an area or sector. This type of large-scale
surveillance of a population can also function as an
instrument of control over the behavior of every individual
within that population. Jeremy Bentham suggested this use
of mass surveillance in his design for an efficient prison
which he called the panopticon—all-seeing device.102
Applied to autonomous vehicles, mass surveillance could
seek to collect personal information about all those who use
autonomous vehicles. Such mass surveillance would collect
and define behavior patterns of autonomous vehicle users.
These profiles could later be useful for such purposes as (i)
creating algorithmic profiles of typical autonomous vehicle
users, (ii) predicting each autonomous vehicle user’s
individual behavior, or (iii) finding one autonomous vehicle
that may or may not be behaving according to prescribed
patterns.
Mass surveillance is sometimes confused with intense,
comprehensive surveillance of a targeted person.
For
example, surveillance of the suspected drug dealer, Antoine
Jones, in United States v. Jones constructed a comprehensive
pattern, or mosaic, of highly detailed information about
Jones’s activities and used that mosaic to locate his drug
stash house.103
Real-time information from the GPS
surveillance device attached to his vehicle allowed law
enforcement to follow Jones and to see him traveling to the
stash house where he was arrested. Just about every
investigative tool in the law enforcement surveillance arsenal
was used against Jones: wiretaps, physical following, fixedcamera surveillance, as well as attachment of a GPS tracking
device to his vehicle, so that the device automatically and
continuously located Jones and recorded his every movement.
However, the GPS tracking was crucial; and it was the
warrantless installation of the GPS device that caused the
United States Supreme Court to overturn Jones’s criminal
conviction. These efforts by law enforcement to follow Jones
everywhere and to collect detailed information about what he
was doing and with whom he was doing it all of the time was
intensive, comprehensive targeted surveillance using massive
resources. But such tracking was not mass surveillance,

102. See FOUCAULT, supra note 96, at 195–228.
103. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 946.
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since the government has not yet tried to watch everyone in
the District of Columbia as intensively as law enforcement
agencies targeted Jones. Nevertheless, the potential for
scaling up the type of massive surveillance used to convict
Jones into region-wide mass surveillance of all persons,
including those not suspected of criminal activity, troubled
some of the Justices who decided Jones.
Mass surveillance operates at a different level from the
comprehensive surveillance that targeted Jones. Instead,
mass surveillance indiscriminately collects personal
information about large numbers of people on a populationwide basis.104 Usually mass surveillance is covert so as not to
affect the patterns of human behavior being recorded. But
mass surveillance can also be overt, as Jeremy Bentham
suggested for the Panopticon Prison.105 Automated photoradar is sometimes used in this open way to deter speeding by
announcing that all vehicles on a particular road will have
their speeds and license plates recorded, and driver
photographs taken, so that citations can be sent
automatically to those who were speeding. Some towns
engage in overt mass surveillance when they post signs that a
photograph of every vehicle and its license plate is taken
upon entering or leaving the municipality.106
Mass surveillance that collects personal information from
everyone on the road is not necessary for most transportation
management and planning purposes.
Anonymous data
identifying neither vehicles nor drivers is sufficient for
calculating traffic flows or road usage for transportation
management and land use planning purposes. For example,

104. Mass surveillance literally gathers up all available information about all
persons within range of the surveillance. Officials hope that some of this
personal information may turn out to be relevant to investigative or intelligence
issues. The hated general warrants in pre-revolutionary America outlawed by
the Fourth Amendment were a form of mass surveillance. See Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349
(1974). Sometimes called “dragnet” surveillance, mass surveillance has been
analogized to Forrest Gump’s famous aphorism: “Life is like a box of chocolates,
you never know what you are going to get.” Similarly, “Mass surveillance is like
a box of chocolates, police never know what they are going to get.” FORREST
GUMP (Paramount Pictures 1994).
105. FOUCAULT, supra note 97, at 195–228.
106. See Will Jason, Tiburon’s Roadside Security Cameras Set to Go Live
Soon, MARIN INDEP. J. (July 27, 2010), available at http://www.marin
ij.com/marinnews/ci_15616255.
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cameras recording roadway traffic flows often use lowresolution optics incapable of capturing specific vehicles or
license plates. Loop detectors or other sensors that do not
identify particular vehicles are used to collect information
about how many vehicles use particular road segments at
particular times and how fast vehicles in general are moving
on those segments. In contrast, more precise roadway
surveillance that collects specific identifying information
about each vehicle or person on a roadway facilitates use of
that information for purposes other than counting cars or
determining traffic speeds.
For example, roadway
surveillance that identifies vehicles or drivers may be used to
enforce traffic laws, as well as to find or to follow a particular
person for further investigation.
Roadway surveillance information that collects personal
data about everyone is often used to compile profiles of people
who use particular routes. Mass-collected personal data
profiles of individuals’ travel patterns can be used not only by
law enforcement, but by marketers and advertisers who use
the data to predict and manipulate future consumer behavior,
for example through direct behavioral advertising. Such
detailed personal information about an autonomous vehicle
user’s locations and on-road behavior can be highly valuable
both to the government and to private sector enterprises of
many different types, such as news media, private
investigators, insurance companies, vehicle product
manufacturers, and political campaigns.
The interconnected version of autonomous vehicles could
enable mass surveillance in the form of comprehensive,
detailed tracking of all autonomous vehicles and their users
at all times and places. The networked nature of this type of
autonomous vehicle involves a communications network that
transmits and receives information related to each particular
vehicle. Being able to identify specific devices may be
necessary for network security. But, unless measures are
taken to assure anonymity as well as data security, the
resulting comprehensive personal information collection could
be used to profile, predict, and perhaps manipulate the
behavior of the vehicles and their users. Law enforcement,
private investigators, advertisers, and marketers will all be
eager to seek access to an interconnected autonomous vehicle
network, as well as to the personal data transmitted through
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such a network, unless the network is carefully planned to
preserve and protect privacy.
It is interesting to note that selfcontained autonomous
vehicles could be used for a different type of mass
surveillance. These vehicles rely on arrays of externally
facing sensors that will continuously collect detailed
information about the roadway environment surrounding the
vehicle. Information from these sensors is processed by the
vehicle’s analytic systems that enable the vehicle to
distinguish toddlers from fireplugs.
As a result, the
selfcontained vehicle will collect detailed data about
everywhere the vehicle travels, as well as everything and
everyone encountered.
In some ways, a selfcontained
autonomous vehicle operates as a “mobile panopticon” that
moves along roads and highways and literally takes in all
details about what is going on in the areas through which the
vehicle travels. Based on such mass surveillance concerns,
Federal Communications Commission imposed sanctions on
Google, for collection of wireless information by “Street
View.”107
Mass surveillance collection and use of personal
information about large numbers of people also compromises
autonomy privacy interests. Surveillance systems—whether
they are law enforcement programs, traffic management
systems, or private marketing systems—all directly affect the
autonomy of travelers by overriding individual control over
who or what watches and keeps track of their movements
from place to place. When the government controls such
universal surveillance, political concerns about centralizing
too much power in a potentially overbearing state reinforce
privacy concerns. Authoritarian systems can misuse such
mass surveillance systems to round up suspects or to treat
individuals or whole categories of people as undesirable or
deserving sanctions based on where they are or where they
have been. Personal mobility is an aspect of people’s lives
that totalitarian political systems particularly seek to control.
Travelers forced to look over their shoulders for
surveillance systems are affected both by knowing and by not

107. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, “In the Matter of Google, Inc.” F.C.C. Order No.
DA 12-592 (April 13, 2012), available at
http://transition.fcc.gov/DA-12592A1.pdf.
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knowing whether or when others are watching their actions
or capturing personal information about them. Particularly
when a person chooses to do something unconventional or
considers going to a potentially notorious destination, such
uncertainty can be stifling.
IV. EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY IN AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
Whether autonomous vehicles present a context in which
people can and should expect protection for privacy interests
is a contentious issue. In legal evaluations of privacy claims,
“reasonable expectations of privacy” analysis is a familiar
way to make an initial determination whether legal
protection for privacy interests would be appropriate under
particular circumstances.
Inquiring into reasonable
expectations of privacy in the context of autonomous vehicles
asks whether society should protect privacy in this setting, in
light of other societal interests, such as safety, convenience,
economic, and environmental concerns.
Reasonable expectation of privacy analysis is normally
associated with legal decisions about whether to enforce
Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures by excluding evidence from criminal
prosecutions.108
In addition, reasonable expectations of
privacy also play a normative role in determining the
“protectability” of privacy interests in tort law,109 as well as
statutory110 and regulatory111 law. Asking about whether
expectations of privacy are reasonable raises policy issues
about whether privacy protection is desirable or appropriate
in a particular setting, such as autonomous vehicles. Because
autonomous vehicles are not yet available for general use,
predictions about privacy expectations regarding autonomous
vehicles necessarily have to be extrapolated from experience
with other types of vehicles, transportation issues, and

108. E.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
109. See, e.g., Sanders v. Am. Broad. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 907 (1999).
110. See, for example, the federal Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50
U.S.C. § 1801 and California’s adopted version at section 1708.8 of the
California Civil Code. Both concern physical or constructive invasions of
privacy.
111. See, e.g., Department of Homeland Security Regulations that Support
Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies, 6 C.F.R. §§ 25.1–25.9.
(2012).
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intelligent systems.
The concept of reasonable expectations of privacy is often
associated with a 1967 United States Supreme Court
Katz excluded from
decision, Katz v. United States.112
evidence in a criminal prosecution defendant’s conversations
recorded by law enforcement from outside a public phone
booth located on a public street. In ruling that the Fourth
Amendment “protects people, not places,” the Supreme Court
rejected basing Fourth Amendment warrant requirements
solely on location and interference with property rights.113
Older analysis had routinely withheld Fourth Amendment
protections from activities in public places and from
intangible intrusions.114 After the decision in Katz, neither
the fact that an activity takes place in a public setting, nor
the fact that the evidence seized is intangible forecloses
Fourth Amendment constitutional protection for privacy
interests. Since most of the personal information generated
by autonomous vehicles will be intangible digital data
collected in public roadway settings, the Katz decision is
important in understanding the basis for Fourth Amendment
protection for expectations of privacy in autonomous
vehicles.115

112. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
113. Id. at 351–52. Although the defendant’s conversations took place in a
public location, the Court insisted that “what he seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” Id.
114. E.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967).
115. In his concurring opinion in Katz, Justice Harlan suggested that
deciding what should and should not be protected as reasonable expectations of
privacy could be based on “a twofold requirement, first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ” Katz,
389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring). Even in situations where each of
the two steps suggested by Justice Harlan is not literally followed, reasonable
expectations of privacy analysis is used to balance Fourth Amendment privacy
interests of an individual with societal interests. Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27 (2001). Occasionally “reasonable” expectation of privacy analysis has
asked whether a privacy expectation is “justifiable,” for example, in United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) and in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989), or “legitimate,” for example, in Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322, 336 (1973) and Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 540
(2001), or sometimes all three, for example, in United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S.
294, 315 (1987).
Critics of “reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis, such as Justice
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Katz and decisions following it do not mean that all
intangible communications in all public places will always be
automatically protected as private. But these decisions do
suggest that communications among interconnected
autonomous vehicles or between autonomous vehicles and
roadside infrastructure, other mobile devices or the cloud
would be eligible for Fourth Amendment protection. No such
cases have arisen yet. The focus in Katz on the individual as
the basis for privacy rights, rather than the place where the
individual is located, makes Fourth Amendment protection
for people using autonomous vehicles more likely.
Recent court decisions appear to have turned an
important corner toward recognizing expanded constitutional
protections for privacy in autonomous vehicles. This is quite
a change from the past when privacy expectations of people in
vehicles on public roadways were often described as ranging
from very low to virtually absent.116 Past reluctance to find
expectations of privacy reasonable in vehicular contexts
reflected two now-receding factors: (1) a general notion that
public roadways are, by their very nature, not places where
people should expect privacy and (2) exceptions to Fourth
Amendment warrant requirements that seemingly excluded
vehicles from constitutional protection. In the twenty-first
century, courts are reconsidering both of these factors. In
fact, expansion of Fourth Amendment protection for people in
vehicles on public roadways is a noticeable trend in court
decisions over the past fifteen years. By the time autonomous

Scalia, complain that reasonable expectation of privacy analysis lacks any
“plausible foundation in the text of the Fourth Amendment.” Minnesota v.
Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring). In Justice Scalia’s view,
the use of reasonable expectations of privacy is blatantly subjective and “selfindulgent.” Id. Justice Scalia slyly suggests that “unsurprisingly, those ‘actual
(subjective) expectations of privacy’ ‘that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable,’ . . . bear an uncanny resemblance to those expectations of privacy
that this Court considers reasonable.” Id. In his view, the answer to what
expectations of privacy are reasonable seems to be resolved by judges deciding
what seems reasonable to them. In United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945
(2012), Justice Scalia’s opinion for the court refuses to apply Katz or reasonable
expectations of privacy as the basis for the court’s decision. Rather, his opinion
focuses on trespass to personal property (Jones’s vehicle) that enabled collection
of evidence against Jones. Id. at 951.
116. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). The Supreme Court
in United States v. Jones, distinguished Knotts as limited to “beeper”
technology. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 95152.
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vehicles become accepted consumer products, recognition of
reasonable expectations of privacy related to persons in
vehicles on public roadways may well be unquestioned.
A. Public Roadway Privacy Expectations
Public roadways are frequently used as illustrations of
settings where privacy is not reasonably expected. Roads are
contrasted with homes where privacy expectations are
high. 117 But that does not mean that no expectations of
privacy on public roads are ever reasonable, or worthy of legal
protection. 118 Societal interests in managing transportation
and roadways so that public roads are not used for nefarious
purposes have had enduring importance. 119 At the same time,
concerns about surveillance privacy interests and excessive
government power in this setting also were recognized early
in the history of the automobile. 120 They have become
increasingly significant.
Early twentieth century automobiles and paved roads
resulted in criminal suspects using vehicles on public
roadways to violate the law.
Law enforcement agents
followed. During Prohibition, 121 the United States Supreme
Court upheld many types of law enforcement efforts to stop
suspected liquor smuggling. 122 Carroll v. United States 123 was

117. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (involving the use of a
thermal imaging device from a public vantage point to monitor the radiation of
heat revealing a marijuana growth inside a person’s home).
118. Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy on the Open Road, 30 OHIO N. L. REV. 295,
295–99 (2004).
119. For example, the thirteenth century nightwalker statutes in England,
Statute of Winchester, 13 Edw. I, Stat. 2, ch.4 (1285), were among the
precursors of twentieth-century vagrancy laws, struck down on void-forvagueness grounds in such cases as Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983),
and Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). Local anticruising ordinances, such as that upheld in Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255
(3d Cir. 1990), are more modern manifestations of law enforcement concerns
about roadways. See also ROGER D. MCGRATH, GUNFIGHTERS, HIGHWAYMEN
AND VIGILANTES: VIOLENCE ON THE FRONTIER (1984).
120. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009); Indianapolis v. Edmond,
531 U.S. 32 (2000).
121. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (ratified 1919, repealed 1933). Roadway
surveillance continued even after bootleggers ceased to pose a problem after
Prohibition was repealed in 1933 by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (ratified 1933).
122. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), which upheld
warrantless wiretapping, reflects another of these efforts to prosecute purveyors
of illegal alcohol. Olmstead was famously overturned in Katz and Berger v. New
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the most prominent of the Prohibition-era automobile search
and seizure cases. This United States Supreme Court
decision approved warrantless stopping and searching of cars
suspected of transporting contraband liquor, but required law
enforcement agents to have probable cause to believe that the
cars they stopped were carrying contraband alcohol. The
Court’s opinion in Carroll did not require a judicial warrant
before law enforcement agents could stop and search vehicles
of suspected bootleggers. But Chief Justice Taft’s opinion for
the Court took pains to recognize that people on public
highways do retain privacy rights. The Court’s opinion
specifically rejected authorizing law enforcement agents “to
stop every automobile . . . and thus subject all persons
lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and
indignity of such a search.”124 Law enforcement searches of
everybody on the road would clearly be “intolerable and
unreasonable.”125 Mass surveillance of all people on all
roadways would not be permissible under the Constitution.
Chief Justice Taft expressed particular concern about
interference with the rights of people using the public
highways “to free passage without interruption or search
unless there is known to a competent official authorized to
search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are
carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.”126
Seventy-five years later, the United States Supreme
Court decided in Indianapolis v. Edmond that stopping every
automobile on a roadway for general law enforcement
purposes constitutes a seizure for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment that requires a judicial warrant.127 The case
involved law enforcement roadblocks that stopped vehicles
that might be carrying illegal drugs. The Court’s decision
expressed uneasiness with earlier constitutional analysis that
had appeared automatically to exclude public roads from
eligibility for privacy protection.
Holding that a law
enforcement drug interdiction program that stopped all cars
along a highway was an unlawful intrusion, the Court
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
123. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
124. Id. at 153–54.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 154.
127. Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
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refused to “sanction [highway] stops justified only by the
generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation
and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has
committed some crime.”128 The Court’s opinion insists on
“drawing the line at roadblocks designed primarily to serve
the general interest in crime control.” According to the Court,
part of the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is “to prevent
such intrusions from becoming a routine part of American
Life.”129 The Supreme Court’s decision in Edmond signaled
an important shift in policy toward protection of
constitutional rights on public roadways. In the Court’s view,
such protection is necessary in order to prevent dangerous
trends toward authoritarian political power.
Since the Supreme Court decision in Edmond, courts
have increasingly recognized and protected privacy rights
associated with vehicles on public roads. In Arizona v. Gant,
a case involving a search incident to an arrest, Justice
Stevens warned against “undervalu[ing] the privacy interests
at stake. Although we have recognized that a motorist’s
privacy interest in his vehicle is less substantial than in his
home, . . . the former interest [of motorists] is nevertheless
important and deserving of constitutional protection.”130 His
opinion noted that “authoriz[ing] police officers to search not
just the passenger compartment but every purse, briefcase, or
other container within that space” is dangerous.131 The Court
rejected “A rule that gives police the power to conduct such a
search whenever an individual is caught committing a traffic
offense, when there is no basis for believing evidence of the
offense might be found in the vehicle.” Such a rule is
unacceptable because it “creates a serious and recurring
threat to the privacy of countless individuals.”132 The Court
emphasized that the character of the threat to the privacy of
so many people, “implicates the central concern underlying
the Fourth Amendment—the concern about giving police
officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a
person’s private effects.”133
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 44.
Id. at 42.
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 344 (2009).
Id. at 345.
Id.
Id.
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Twenty-first century courts have been increasingly
willing to find and protect privacy expectations on public
roads because of concerns about the destructive power of
surveillance and wariness about excessive societal control
that leads to authoritarianism. As a result, it is likely that if
law enforcement agencies were to use an autonomous vehicle
communications network to control or to stop an
interconnected autonomous vehicle on a public road, such a
seizure would be subject to constitutional protection requiring
at least a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.134 United
States v. Jones suggests that a warrant may be required
before such an intrusion. Moreover, in United States v. Jones
the Court protected Fourth Amendment personal information
privacy interests in data about one’s movement from place to
Use of an interconnected autonomous vehicle
place.135
communications network to provide evidence of traffic
violations, such as excessive speed, also appears to call for
Constitutional protection.136 The Court’s decision in United
States v. Jones specifically requires a warrant before law
enforcement agents can legally attach a tracking device to a
vehicle and then use the device remotely and continuously to
follow a suspect’s vehicle on public roadways.137 Of course, if
law enforcement sought to break into a selfcontained
autonomous vehicle to retrieve evidence of past locations or
activities, such action would also require a warrant.
One of the central issues posed in the Jones case was
whether Jones had reasonable privacy expectations protected
by the Fourth Amendment as he drove his wife’s car around
the Washington, D.C. area for a month with a governmentinstalled GPS tracking device capturing every move the
vehicle and its driver made. During oral argument, members
of the Court asked a number of questions about a possible
analogy between a person driving a vehicle on which law
enforcement had secretly installed a GPS tracking device and

134. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004) (requiring at least a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity for stopping a vehicle).
135. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
136. Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring). The concurring opinions in Jones are
particularly emphatic about this point.
137. Id. at 949. Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court is particularly
concerned about the intrusion on the vehicle owner’s autonomy when law
enforcement agents installed the GPS device.
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a person wearing an overcoat to which law enforcement
agents had surreptitiously attached a GPS device. 138 The
implication was that just as an overcoat wearer reasonably
expects not to be tracked, a vehicle driver also reasonably
expects not to be tracked. This analogy raises the intriguing
question of whether using an autonomous car could be in
some ways like wearing an overcoat—at least with regard to
expectations of privacy. If an overcoat wearer reasonably
expects that he or she will not be tracked through an unseen
device attached to his or her overcoat, it is at least arguable
that an autonomous car user should also reasonably expect
that he or she would not be tracked through the autonomous
vehicle network. The decision in United States v. Jones
suggests that, unless a warrant is first secured, automated
remote tracking of an autonomous vehicle on public roadways
would interfere with reasonable expectations of privacy
protected under the Fourth Amendment.
B. Vehicle Exceptions to Fourth Amendment Warrant
Requirements
A second factor that in the past seemed to indicate lower
expectations of privacy regarding motor vehicles is what is
called the “automobile” exception to Fourth Amendment
prohibitions against warrantless searches. Although the
words seem to imply that automobiles are not subject to
Fourth Amendment protections at all, the “automobile
exception” never meant that vehicles were completely exempt
from Fourth Amendment privacy protection. Nor did the
exception ever mean that all intrusions on autonomy privacy
and interference with personal information privacy through
searches of vehicles were constitutionally permissible. The
vehicle exception does not apply to seizures of automobiles at
all, although in some cases an automobile search is of a
vehicle that has already been lawfully seized. Over time, the
application of this exception has become increasingly narrow,
to the point that it is unlikely to diminish or adversely
affect reasonable expectations of privacy in most

138. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, 18–20, 31, United States v. Jones
(2011) (No. 10-1259), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_transcripts/10-1259.pdf (questions from Kennedy, Sotomayor &
Kagan, JJ.) (last visited Apr. 24, 2012).

GLANCY FINAL

1224

11/15/2012 8:46 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

autonomous vehicles.
In its current form, the automobile exception only
exempts law enforcement from having to secure a judicial
warrant before searching a vehicle after the vehicle has been
lawfully stopped. All other Constitutional protections apply,
except for the requirement of a judicial warrant before the
vehicle is searched. Importantly, law enforcement agents
searching stopped vehicles have to establish and document
probable cause before any warrantless vehicle search. Three
reasons have been asserted to justify this narrow exception:
(1) the fact that vehicles are inherently mobile, (2) what is
sometimes considered to be a reduced (but not absent)
expectation of privacy in a vehicle and (3) historical
distinctions between searches of automobiles as compared
with dwellings.139 The first reason has by now become the
main justification.
Under the Constitution, all vehicle searches must be
reasonable, as well as justified by a finding of probable cause
based on objective evidence. This probable cause requirement
for all vehicle searches is a tough standard. Law enforcement
agents have the burden of showing objective facts that
amount to probable cause to believe that a lawfully stopped
vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity or contraband.
Subjective beliefs and suspicions are insufficient. Only if law
enforcement agents have first made a fact-based finding of
probable cause are they excused from having to secure a
judicial warrant to authorize a vehicle search.
Such
intrusions on autonomy privacy as searching areas of the
vehicle where such evidence might be found have to be based
on objective facts demonstrating probable cause.140 Assuming
that a future autonomous vehicle was lawfully stopped, under
current interpretations of the automobile exception, the
vehicle would be subject to warrantless search only if law
enforcement agents had sufficient objective facts to determine
that there is probable cause that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in the autonomous vehicle.
A series of twenty-first century United States Supreme
Court decisions have rejected earlier standards that would

139. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391–93 (1985).
140. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009); United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798 (1982); People v. Panah, 35 Cal. 4th 395, 469 (2005).
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have permitted vehicle searches based on law enforcement
agents’ subjective suspicions.141 Courts now repeatedly state
that more lax police practices than objective findings of
probable cause are unacceptable in a democratic society.
These days, automobile search decisions, reported and
unreported, usually rely on Gant142 to require greater
protection for privacy before vehicles can be searched. This
trend toward making it more difficult for law enforcement
agents to search a vehicle without first having secured a
judicial warrant, is based in part on concerns about law
enforcement overreaching as well as worries about the
potential for remote surveillance such as that denounced in
the separate concurring opinions in United States v. Jones.143
Recent court decisions interpreting the Fourth
Amendment have paid increasing attention to enhanced
expectations of privacy in the contexts of roadways,144 of
vehicles,145 and of technologically enhanced searches.146 Since
use of autonomous vehicles will involve all of these contextual
factors, privacy expectations in autonomous vehicles should
be protected under the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, the full
range of privacy interests discussed above—from autonomy to
personal information to surveillance—are included in the
reasonable expectations of privacy of people who in the future
will use autonomous vehicles.
V.

OPTIMIZING INTERACTIONS BETWEEN PRIVACY AND
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES

As autonomous vehicles begin to be marketed to people in
the United States, privacy protection will help to foster trust
in these new modes of travel. Without appropriate legal
protections for privacy, autonomous vehicles could well meet
“market resistance” from potential users who perceive
autonomous vehicles as threats to their privacy. Similarly,
assuring respect for user privacy is one of the best ways to

141. Gant involved a search of a vehicle incident to an arrest of the driver.
Gant, 556 U.S. at 344.
142. Id.
143. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954–55 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring); Id. at 957–58 (Alito, J., concurring).
144. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009).
145. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945.
146. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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foster trust and confidence in new technologies such as
autonomous vehicles.
The most efficient and effective strategy for optimizing
interactions between privacy and autonomous vehicles is
through building privacy protection into autonomous vehicles
from the start. Being proactive about privacy also helps in
strengthening user trust.
Such a strategy has been
popularized as “privacy by design,” a concept derived from
values-in-design methodologies long advocated by privacy
theorists such as Helen Nissenbaum.147 The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) has proposed privacy by design as a way
to integrate privacy into applications of technology,
particularly online technologies.148 One FTC commissioner
described privacy by design as “baking in” privacy, as if a
technology application were a cake and privacy a key
ingredient.149 A number of United States companies already
follow their own versions of privacy by design to integrate
privacy considerations into business models, consumer
product design, product development cycles, and new
technology applications.
Companies such as Microsoft,
Google, IBM, and Hewlett-Packard apply privacy by design in
developing new products.150 The White House has also
endorsed privacy by design.151 In the transportation sector,
privacy by design was suggested as a useful strategy for
Intelligent Transportation Systems as early as 2008.152
In Canada, Anne Cavoukian, Ontario’s Information and
Privacy Commissioner, is a major proponent of privacy by
design. She insists that, “Privacy assurance must ideally
become an organization’s default mode of operation” and
describes privacy by design as “a holistic view of privacy
147. HELEN F. NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 1–10 (Stanford Univ.
Press 2010).
148. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 49; see also In the Matter of Google
Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4336 (Oct. 13, 2011).
149. Julie Brill, FTC Commissioner, Opening Remarks at W3C Meeting (Apr.
11, 2012) at 1, available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/brill/120411w3c
remarks.pdf.
150. Kashmir Hill, Why ‘Privacy By Design’ Is the New Corporate Hotness,
FORBES (July 28, 2011, 10:23 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/
2011/07/28/why-privacy-by-design-is-the-new-corporate-hotness/.
151. WHITE HOUSE PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 63.
152. TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD, USING VEHICLE INTEGRATION
DATA, PART 2: CROSS-CUTTING VII DATA ISSUES, 87th Annual Meeting,
Washington, D.C., Session 682 (Jan. 16, 2008).
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protection.” It
prescribes that privacy be embedded directly into the
design and operation of not only information technologies,
but also of business practices, physical design and
networked infrastructure. This broad-based perspective
on privacy requires that attention be paid to responsible
information management throughout all of the
interacting, interrelated, and interdependent elements
that comprise organizations and their assorted lines of
business.153

Ms. Cavoukian’s privacy-by-design approach rests on seven
foundation principles, beginning with the importance of being
“Proactive not Reactive; Preventative not Remedial.”154 Other
Privacy by Design principles include Privacy as the Default
Setting, Privacy Embedded Directly into Design, Full
Functionality (Positive-Sum, not Zero-Sum), End-to-End
Security (Full Lifecycle Protection), Visibility and
Transparency, and Respect for User Privacy (Keep it UserCentric).155

153. ANN CAVOUKIAN & MARILYN PROSCH, PRIVACY BY REDESIGN: BUILDING
BETTER LEGACY 1 (2011), available at http://privacybydesign.ca/
content/uploads/2011/05/PbRD.pdf.
154. Id. at 1.
155. Privacy by Design: The 7 Foundational Principles explains each of these
principles:
1. Proactive Not Reactive; Preventative Not Remedial
The Privacy by Design (PbD) approach is characterized by
proactive rather than reactive measures. It anticipates and
prevents privacy invasive events before they happen. PbD does
not wait for privacy risks to materialize, nor does it offer remedies
for resolving privacy infractions once they have occurred – it aims
to prevent them from occurring. In short, Privacy by Design comes
before-the-fact, not after.
2. Privacy as the Default
We can all be certain of one thing – the default rules! Privacy by
Design seeks to deliver the maximum degree of privacy by
ensuring that personal data are automatically protected in any
given IT system or business practice. If an individual does
nothing, their privacy still remains intact. No action is required
on the part of the individual to protect their privacy – it is built
into the system, by default.
3. Privacy Embedded into Design
Privacy by Design is embedded into the design and architecture of
IT systems and business practices. It is not bolted on as an addon, after the fact. The result is that privacy becomes an essential
component of the core functionality being delivered. Privacy is
integral to the system, without diminishing functionality.
A
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As practiced in Canada, the objective of privacy by design
is to restore individual control over personal information
while providing organizations a competitive advantage over
time. In January 2012, the Ontario Privacy Commissioner’s
Office broadened its privacy-by-design focus to include
autonomy interests and surveillance concerns when it hosted
a Symposium, “Beware of ‘Surveillance by Design:’ Standing
Up for Freedom and Privacy.” In introducing the symposium,
Ms. Cavoukian warned that, “Privacy is absolutely
fundamental to freedom. Historically, when societies have
morphed from a free and democratic society into a
totalitarian state, privacy has been the first thread to
unravel. Forfeiting privacy in favour of security, not only
represents flawed logic, but is unnecessary—it is a false
tradeoff.”156

4. Full Functionality – Positive-Sum, not Zero-Sum
Privacy by Design seeks to accommodate all legitimate interests
and objectives in a positive-sum “win-win” manner, not through a
dated, zero-sum approach, where unnecessary trade-offs are
made. Privacy by Design avoids the pretense of false dichotomies,
such as privacy vs. security, demonstrating that it is possible to
have both.
5. End-to-End Lifecycle Protection
Privacy by Design, having been embedded into the system prior to
the first element of information being collected, extends
throughout the entire lifecycle of the data involved, from start to
finish. This ensures that at the end of the process, all data are
securely destroyed, in a timely fashion. Thus, Privacy by Design
ensures cradle to grave, lifecycle management of information,
end-to-end.
6. Visibility and Transparency
Privacy by Design seeks to assure all stakeholders that whatever
the business practice or technology involved, it is in fact,
operating according to the stated promises and objectives, subject
to independent verification. Its component parts and operations
remain visible and transparent, to users and providers alike.
Remember, trust but verify.
7. Respect for User Privacy
Above all, Privacy by Design requires architects and operators to
keep the interests of the individual uppermost by offering such
measures as strong privacy defaults, appropriate notice, and
empowering user-friendly options. Keep it user-centric.
ANN CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN: THE 7 FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES 1–2
(2009), available at http://www.ontla.on.ca/library/repository/mon/23008/
295010.pdf.
156. Ann Cavoukian, Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario,
Introductory Address at Symposium: Beware of “Surveillance by Design:”
Standing Up for Freedom and Privacy (Jan. 27, 2012), available at
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The first step in privacy by design is a privacy impact
assessment before launching a product, technology, or
application. In the United States, privacy assessments are
already fairly common. They were discussed in connection
with the enactment of the Privacy Act of 1974 and were
eventually mandated for federal agencies by the EGovernment Act of 2002 that regulates personal information
contained in federal government records systems. The 2002
E-Government Act mandates a prior Privacy Impact
Assessment (PIA) to evaluate the privacy impact of any
substantially revised or new federal agency Information
Technology System.157
To the extent that the federal
government is involved in creating or managing a
communications network for autonomous vehicles, or collects
data related to users of autonomous vehicles, a PIA is already
required to assess in advance the ramifications of the system
in terms of personal information privacy. An effective initial
privacy strategy for autonomous vehicles158 would require
privacy impact assessments for all autonomous vehicle
projects.
Moreover, the substance of these privacy
assessments should be expanded so that the assessments
consider impacts on autonomy privacy and surveillance
concerns, as well as personal information privacy.
In early 2012, the White House proposed a Consumer
Privacy Bill of Rights, launched with a report, “Consumer
Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework for
Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global
Digital Economy” (White House Privacy Report).159 This
report suggests that “The Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights

http://www.realprivacy.ca/speakers.
157. E-Government Act, Pub. L. 107-347, Title V, § 208 (2002). Title V is the
Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act. Section 208
is entitled “Privacy Provisions” and pertains to privacy impact assessments. As
in Privacy by Design, privacy assessments broadly apply to federal government
personal information systems, although there are a number of exceptions.
158. Applying Privacy by Design to autonomous vehicles should begin well
before the design stage with farsighted assessment of how these vehicles will
affect privacy over the long run. The earlier parts of this Article suggest an
outline for such high-level assessment. Autonomous vehicles seem to be
precisely the type of technologies that would benefit from careful attention to
users’ expectations. Privacy by Design is a particularly effective business
practice for enterprises seeking to develop successful consumer products that
will rely on the trust of users.
159. WHITE HOUSE PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 63.
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should be the legal baseline that governs consumer data
The White House’s
privacy in the United States.”160
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights seems directly to apply to at
least some types of autonomous vehicles, particularly
interconnected
autonomous
vehicles
that
rely
on
communications networks.
The personal data that is the focus of the White House
Privacy Report privacy is “any data, including aggregations of
data, which is linkable to a specific individual. Personal data
may include data that is linked to a specific computer or other
device,” such as an identifier used to build a usage profile.161
This definition appears to describe potential autonomous
vehicle networks that would be based on the United States
Department
of
Transportation’s
Connected
Vehicle
Program.162 The White House Privacy Report is concerned
about “maintaining consumer trust in networked
technologies,”163 and seeks to work with private sector
stakeholders to protect privacy rights of consumers, with or
without the need for further legislation. The specific rights
included in the White House Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights
are Individual Control, Transparency, Respect for Context,
Security, Access and Accuracy, Focused Collection, and
Accountability.164 Attention to these privacy rights endorsed
by the United States President can help to optimize synergies
between privacy and autonomous vehicles.
In addition to the White House Consumer Privacy Bill of
Rights, many similar privacy principles and even bills of
privacy rights have been suggested in recent years. Most
outline what are familiarly called Fair Information Practices
(FIPs), or Fair Information Practices Principles (FIPPs).
Such privacy principles have been endorsed by federal
agencies such as the Department of Commerce and the
Federal Trade Commission.165 Many privacy principles have

160. Id. at 45.
161. Id. at 10 (footnote omitted). The omitted footnote notes that the
definition of personal data is similar to the definition of “personally identifiable
information” used in connection with the Privacy Act of 1974.
162. See discussion supra Part I.A-B.
163. WHITE HOUSE PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 63 at i.
164. Id. at 10.
165. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE: INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, supra
note 50; FED. TRADE COMM’N REPORT, supra note 49.
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been proposed as self-regulatory standards by industry
groups. Of the many industry self-regulatory initiatives, one
of the more pertinent to autonomous vehicles is the GSMA
2012
“Mobile
Privacy
Principles,”
Association’s166
accompanied by extensive “Guidelines for Mobile Application
Development.”167 The GSMA describes its core privacy values
as “transparency, choice, and control—putting the user
first.”168 The GSMA Privacy Guidelines discuss ways to
implement a privacy-by-design proactive approach in a mobile
environment. They include explanations of fair information
practices in a mobile setting, as well as examples and
illustrative use cases. Since autonomous vehicles will share
many location privacy issues with mobile applications, the
GSMA principles and guidelines illustrate a potential privacy
strategy. With regard to transportation technologies, a
particularly useful privacy policy strategy for autonomous
vehicles is the Vehicle Infrastructure Integration (VII)
Privacy Policies Framework (VII Privacy Framework).169 The
VII Privacy Framework was unanimously adopted by the VII
Coalition, a public-private group brought together by the
United States Department of Transportation to evaluate the
feasibility of deployment of a nationwide DSRC network for
vehicle safety and mobility.170 Until it was disbanded in 2007,
166. GSMA (Groupe Speciale Mobile Association) refers to the powerful trade
association (including around a thousand mobile telecommunications
companies) that promotes the GSM mobile telephone system world-wide. See
Membership, GSMA, http://www.gsma.com/history/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2012).
167. Privacy Design Guidelines of Mobile Application Development, GSMA,
http://www.gsma.com/documents/privacy-design-guidelines-for-mobileapplication-development/20008 (last visited Apr. 22, 2012).
168. Mobile Privacy Principles, GSMA, http://www.gsma.com/documents/
mobile-privacy-principles/20005/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). Additional GSMA
Mobile privacy principles include: Openness, Transparency and Notice, followed
by Purpose and Use, User Choice and Control, Data Minimization and
Retention, Respect User Rights, Security, Education, Children and Adolescents,
Accountability and Enforcement. Id.
169. INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES SUBCOMM. OF THE NAT’L VII COAL., VEHICLE
INFRASTRUCTURE INTEGRATION: PRIVACY POLICIES FRAMEWORK, (Feb. 16,
FRAMEWORK]
available
at
2007),
[hereinafter
VII
PRIVACY
http://www.its.dot.gov/research_docs/61vii_privacy_framework.htm.
The
Framework was drafted by the Institutional Issues Subcommittee and
unanimously adopted by the Executive Leadership Team of the VII Coalition.
170. VII refers to “Vehicle Infrastructure Integration,” a USDOT program
designed to implement the FCC’s allocation in 1999 of the spectrum band at 5.9
GHz for dedicated short-range communications (DSRC). The application of this
communications spectrum to vehicle-based communications for safety and
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the VII Coalition was composed of vehicle manufacturers, as
well as state, regional, and federal transportation regulators.
Its goal was to facilitate development and deployment of a
national Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC)
The VII Privacy Framework
system for vehicles.171
represents a rare transportation-related example of proactive
privacy policies created in advance to govern the rollout of a
major new transportation technology. The Framework’s
policies continued to guide privacy protection as the VII
system became part of the IntelliDriveSM program and later
an aspect of the Connected Vehicle Program.172 To the extent
that autonomous vehicles will use a national DSRC network,
the VII Privacy Framework appears directly to apply.173
The VII Privacy Framework was conceived as a way to
help sync the technical design of VII’s advanced vehicle
communications technologies with individuals’ autonomy and
personal information privacy interests, as well as with civil
liberties concerns about surveillance. The goal was to assure
that the technical design and operation of a nationwide DSRC
network would respect reasonable privacy expectations.
Between 2004 and 2007, a subcommittee of the VII Coalition
painstakingly developed consensus regarding two related
documents.
These documents first articulate privacy
principles tailored to the particulars of the VII’s vehicle-based
DSRC technologies and then set boundaries for legitimate
uses of VII. The process involved important input from a

mobility purposes was launched by the United States Department of
Transportation in 2004 as the VII Program. Id.
171. DSRC is a radio network at 5.9 GHz (5.850-5.925 GHz) spectrum that
features extremely low latency (quick on the uptake) allocated by the Federal
Communications Commission in 1999 for vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-toinfrastructure communications. Because of the quickness (low latency) of this
frequency, DSRC is likely to be needed for V2V communications by the
interconnected vehicle type of autonomous vehicles. See Robert B. Kelly &
Mark D. Johnson, Defining a Stable, Protected and Secure Spectrum
Environment for Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1271, 1281–82,
1289–90 (2012).
172. Connected Vehicle Research, supra note 8.
173. The VII Privacy Policies Framework defines the National VII Program
as a broad complex including “all physical, technical and functional aspects of
the subsystems and components used to collect, receive, transmit, store, and/or
disseminate data and information, as well as the institutional structures and
measures implemented in order to govern VII System users and
administrators.” VII PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 169.
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variety of stakeholders, including privacy advocacy
organizations in the development of appropriate privacy
policies for DSRC technology. This process was precedent
setting in fashioning appropriately tailored privacy policies to
fit the VII technology as that technology was being developed.
Concentrated efforts to devise privacy policies that would
work in the complex world of vehicle regulation, vehicle
manufacturing, and the often-multifarious concerns of people
who are expected to use and to rely on new transportation
technology produced the VII Privacy Framework.
The first part of the Framework contains the VII Privacy
Principles that are designed to assure that, to the greatest
extent possible, individuals who use VII-equipped vehicles
will be able to do so privately and anonymously. Such an
objective is sometimes described as minimization of personal
information. To the extent that personal information might
be needed for specific DSRC applications or services, the VII
Privacy Principles emphasize the importance of fair
information practices. These practices include as notice and
consent, as well as the need for careful protection of personal
information and for limits on how long personal information
would be retained by the network and those with access to it.
The nine VII Privacy Principles begin with Respect for
Privacy and Personal Information and include Information
Purposes, Acquisition, Notice, Fair Information Use,
Information
Protection
and
Retention,
Openness,
Participation and Accountability. The principles emphasize
the importance of anonymity secured, in part, through
technical methods designed and built into the DSRC System.
Based on OECD privacy guidelines,174 the principles were
presented in the familiar context of Fair Information
Practices (FIPs) already widely used in both the public and
private sectors in the United States. At the same time, each
principle was carefully crafted to apply specifically to the VII
program’s vehicle-based DSRC communications network. A
similar effort will also be needed in shaping privacy
protection for autonomous vehicles.

174. OECD GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER
FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA, http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3746,en_2649_
34223_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2012).
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The second part of the VII Privacy Framework regarding
Privacy Limits is far more innovative and important.175 This
aspect of the VII Privacy Framework sets boundaries on uses
of personal information collected by or through a national
DSRC network. These Limits establish clear lines beyond
which VII’s DSRC network is not to be operated or used. The
Limits call out particular potential uses of the VII system
that, for policy reasons, cannot be allowed.176 Such defined
policy boundaries are a particularly effective way to build
consumer trust and confidence. Being clear in advance about
what the technology will and will not do with regard to user
privacy is an essential trust-building strategy.
The VII Privacy Limits are organized according to
functional areas in which the DSRC network would operate:
public-sector transportation, public-sector commerce and toll
collection, public-sector regulation and commercial vehicle
permitting, law enforcement/investigation, public security
surveillance, private-sector commerce, and private-sector
transportation.
This functional organization adapts the
Limits to the practical contexts of particular DSRC vehicle
technology applications.
The Limits emphasize vehicle
owners’ rights to remain anonymous through the technical
design of the DSRC network, as well as through operational
controls over the National VII Program. Voluntary individual
user consent and choice set important boundaries with regard
to use of personal information derived from the DSRC
network. For example, the Limits provide that, except for
specific public sector regulation and commercial vehicle
permitting applications in which personal information is
required by law, individuals using DSRC-equipped vehicles
should not be required to supply personal information.
The VII Privacy Policies Framework was developed as a
foundation. More detailed privacy guidance and further
legislative and regulatory measures were expected to carry
out the fundamental privacy protections and expectations

175. VII PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 169 (referring to the section
entitled, Vehicle Infrastructure Integration Privacy Limits on Uses of Personal
Information).
176. For example, Limit 4 provides that “the National VII Program shall not
be used by law enforcement for: recording real-time video or voice of vehicle
occupants, or . . . off-board control of vehicle driving or maneuvering functions.”
VII PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 169.
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outlined in the Framework. In considering privacy protection
for autonomous vehicles, a similar deliberative process of
consensus building among stakeholders, including privacy
advocacy groups would be wise. A privacy policy framework
similarly structured in two parts—one containing principles
and the other providing limits to technological applications—
provides a useful model for creating an autonomous vehicles
privacy policies framework.
So far, there are neither technical nor legal standards
specifically addressed to autonomous vehicles. In addition to
high-level, privacy-by-design measures, privacy standards
need to be included among the legal and technical
requirements for autonomous vehicles. Technical criteria
regarding such matters as anonymization of personal
information generated by and gathered from autonomous
vehicles, as well as data encryption standards, need to be
adopted for all autonomous vehicles before they are launched
into the consumer market.
The Society of Automotive
Engineers (SAE) On-Road Autonomous Vehicle Standards
Committee (part of the Vehicle Engineering Systems Group of
the Motor Vehicle Council) embarked on standard setting for
“On-Road Autonomous Vehicles” in 2012.177 Standards for
autonomous vehicles are being called for by both industry and
legislators.178 Privacy requirements should be among these
standards.
Legislation is also likely to affect interactions between
privacy and autonomous vehicles. Privacy issues related to a
person’s physical location (often called “location privacy”)
have become highly visible.
In response, legislation
governing that aspect of autonomous vehicles has already
been introduced.
Legislation pending before the 112th
Congress in 2012 includes both Senator Franken’s “Location
Privacy Protection Act” (S. 1223) and the “Geolocation
Privacy and Surveillance Act” (H.R. 2168 and S. 1212) as well
as Senator Leahy’s “Electronic Communications Privacy Act
Amendments Act of 2011” (S. 1011), of which Section 5
177. See On-Road Autonomous Vehicle Standards Committee, supra note 65.
178. For example, California State Senator Alex Padilla has introduced SB
1298 to allow autonomous vehicles to be licenseable in California. Chuck
Squatriglia, California Lawmaker Wants Rules for Robo-Cars, Autopia Blog,
WIRED (Feb. 29, 2012, 7:10 PM), http://www.wired.com/autopia/2012/02/padillarobo-cars-sb-1298.

GLANCY FINAL

1236

12/1/2012 11:17 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

focuses on “Location Information Privacy.” In the Executive
Branch, the White House has suggested legislative enactment
of the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, discussed above, that
directly addresses networks and location information both of
which are likely to be features of autonomous vehicles.179
Proposed legislation likely to affect autonomous vehicles
contains a variety of initiatives. These legislative proposals
are significant because they all call for protection of location
privacy rights of consumers, including those who may become
users of autonomous vehicles.
For example, Senator
Franken’s proposed legislation, S. 1223, expressly applies to
communications devices, “including but not limited to, a
vehicle the individual drives.”180 All of the various legislative
proposals regarding location privacy place privacy protection
responsibilities on technology providers to assure that
potential users retain control over collection of personal
location information and affirmatively and knowingly consent
before users’ personal location information is collected or
used. In the future, federal legislation may also specifically
regulate autonomous vehicles on a national basis. If so,
requirements for privacy protections, as well as privacy
impact analyses and regular privacy audits, should be
included, as well as limits prohibiting use of autonomous
vehicles for surveillance purposes.
As a regulatory matter, the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA) has indicated that the
agency understands the importance of privacy, particularly
location privacy, with regard to regulating autonomous
vehicles.181
Regulatory measures either in the form of
autonomous vehicle safety standards related to consumer
acceptance or in response to legislation regarding
autonomous vehicles would wisely include specific
requirements for protection of autonomous vehicle users’
privacy. Since NHTSA considers privacy protection to be an
important aspect of consumer acceptance of autonomous
vehicles,182 safety rules regarding autonomous vehicles are
should recognize the need not only for technical standards,

179.
180.
181.
182.

See WHITE HOUSE PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 63.
Location Privacy Protection Act, S. 1223, 112th Cong. § 3(a) (2011).
See Wood et al., supra note 8, at 1446, 1461–63, 1466–67.
Id.
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but also for privacy policies as well.
Other federal agencies, including both the Federal Trade
Commission and the Department of Commerce, have
suggested the need for particular measures to protect location
information in the context of Internet browsing and mobile
devices. The Federal Trade Commission Report, “Protecting
Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change,” released in
March 2012, expresses specific concern about location-based
mobile services.183 Since that time, FTC has intensified its
scrutiny of both on-line Internet tracking and on-the-road
location tracking.184 Concerns about Internet tracking related
to online behavioral advertising that records people’s
movements on the Internet are in some ways similar to
concerns about tracking people in real space, including people
using autonomous vehicles. In both contexts, user choice and
consent are as important as they are difficult to obtain and to
maintain. Both on the road and on line, “Do Not Track”
should mean, “when the consumer so chooses, Do Not
Collect.”185
Many different privacy-enhancing technologies, such as
encryption and anonymization, are available to privacyminded autonomous vehicle developers. Autonomous vehicles
have the potential to apply intelligent systems to make
protection of privacy interests automatic. For example,
privacy limits (such as transmitting or retaining only
anonymous information, or automatic encryption of all
personal information) could be built into an autonomous
vehicle’s technology to prevent privacy problems from arising.
Such measures would also reassure autonomous vehicle
users, who might otherwise be reluctant to trust autonomous
vehicles because of privacy concerns. Autonomous vehicles
also could be technically prevented from collecting, storing, or
transmitting specific information related to a person, such as
the person’s location or home address. In other words, the
intelligence that drives an autonomous vehicle should be
smart enough to make privacy protection part of the

183. See FED. TRADE COMM’N REPORT, supra note 49.
184. See, e.g., Id.; MOBILE APPS FOR KIDS: CURRENT PRIVACY DISCLOSURES
ARE DISAPPOINTING (2012), available at http://ftc.gov/os/2012/02/120216
mobile_apps_kids.pdf.
185. Brill, supra note 62.
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architecture of autonomous vehicles.
An autonomous vehicle can be designed to minimize
personal information that it generates, collects, or retains.
Such technical measures as encryption and access controls
can also help prevent any personal information that is
collected by an autonomous vehicle from becoming available
to others. If personal information is necessary to perform a
particular function (such as toll payment), that personal
information should be automatically destroyed when that
transitory purpose (paying the toll) has been accomplished.186
Autonomous vehicles can also be built to prevent external
control from taking over an autonomous vehicle from its user.
Measures that permit a user to retain or to regain control
over the vehicle would also facilitate autonomy privacy
interests of prospective users of autonomous vehicles.187
Particular types of autonomous vehicles will likely
require attention to different types of privacy enhancing
technologies. For example, an interconnected autonomous
vehicle will likely transmit significant amounts of
information, potentially including personal information. That
personal information needs to be rendered anonymous, as
well as encrypted, before it is transmitted into the network.
Moreover, access to such a network needs to be secured
through such controls as changing encryption keys and
identifiers. The selfcontained type of autonomous vehicle will
also require strict limits on retaining personal information
and efforts to protect the anonymity of users. Any recorded
personal information would also need to be strongly
encrypted, protected by access authentication and subject to
tough physical security.
Preventing use of both types of autonomous vehicles from
becoming surveillance tools will require political commitment
as well as legal enforcement of privacy norms protecting
186. For example, the 511.org traveler information system in the San
Francisco Bay area has embraced significant privacy protections. See Privacy,
511 SF BAY TRAFFIC, http://traffic.511.org/privacy.asp (last visited Apr. 22,
2012); see also Adam Clymer, Tracking Bay Area Traffic Creates Concern for
Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2002, at A11.
187. For example, a recent article has made a special plea that all
autonomous vehicles should have a steering wheel. Jonah Goldberg, Take the
Wheel, Somebody, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Mar. 9, 2012, 12:00 AM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/293005/take-wheel-somebody-jonahgoldberg.
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individuals from potentially overbearing social and
governmental systems. Most important, these privacy issues
must be systematically addressed in advance—before
autonomous vehicles become consumer products.
CONCLUSION
Careful attention both to privacy and to the potential of
autonomous vehicles to enhance safety and mobility can
generate favorable synergies. Privacy concerns will influence
how autonomous vehicles are configured, just as individual
privacy and freedom will be affected by the ways in which
autonomous vehicles are designed and operated. Infusing
privacy into these powerful disruptive technologies will
present many challenges, none of them insurmountable. In
the end, the future success of autonomous vehicles will
depend in part on how well privacy interests and autonomous
vehicles can work together. This Article has discussed some
ways to make that happen. Now, before consumer versions
are offered to the public, autonomous vehicles have a unique
opportunity to design privacy into these new modes of
personal mobility.
After all, autonomous vehicles that
deserve the trust and confidence of people who will decide
whether or not to use them is a goal shared by both
autonomous vehicle developers and those concerned about
personal privacy.

